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Articles
When Hospitals Sue Patients
ISAAC D. BUCK†
“The biggest crime you can commit in America is being sick.”1
Grimly demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic, hospitals serve as the central hub of American
health care. Increasingly exercising market power, setting clinical standards, and fostering
innovation, hospitals’ influence over health care delivery and access is unmatched. They are the
behemoth in the delivery chain, exerting unrivaled control.
As such, hospitals have naturally become the locus of the worst of the collision between
consumerism and universality, between cost and access—a gloomy setting for citizens who simply
cannot afford the health care they need to flourish, or to survive. Indeed, the price of American
health care—a cost that is increasingly borne by American patients—is unsustainable. Those
costs continue to rise thanks to a pernicious mix of increasingly brittle and ineffective insurance
plans, a squeeze on public funding, and a lack of price sensitivity among the providers of
American health care. Patients are suffering. And hospitals are not getting paid.
In a predictable but catastrophic turn, hospitals are suing their former patients for unpaid medical
bills. Litigation has replaced systematic financing. The operating room has been swapped for the
courtroom. And adversarial proceedings now follow the Hippocratic Oath.
Tracking the phenomenon of these lawsuits, this Article lays out the harms that result to the
American health care system. When hospitals sue patients, they harm public health and destroy
patient trust. And they shatter widely held beliefs, highlighting the inadequacy of policy goals and
the inequity of health finance rules.
Further, once and for all, they expose the failure of the consumer-based paradigm of American
health care, spotlighting the inapplicability of moral hazard and demonstrating the means by
which individuals with private insurance and high deductibles—a rapidly growing population in
the United States—are inadequately protected against the very actors that undertake to protect
their health and wellbeing. This Article makes the moral, legal, and policy-based argument that
hospital lawsuits against former patients must be brought to an end. American patients simply
cannot afford it.

† Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Juris Doctor, University of Pennsylvania
Law School; Master of Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania; Bachelor of Arts, Miami University (Ohio).
1. Laura Ungar, Heart Disease Bankrupted Him Once. Now He Faces Another $10,000 Medical Bill, NPR
(Sept. 25, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/25/916514499/heart-diseasebankrupted-him-once-now-he-faces-another-10-000-medical-bill (quoting 31-year-old Matthew Fentress of
Louisville, Kentucky, who faces a second potential medical bankruptcy, following a surgical procedure known as
an ablation in an effort to correct a heart arrhythmia).
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INTRODUCTION
Well before the day when a judge hears from a plaintiff hospital that is
suing a patient it once cared for, the rickety structure of health care finance—
made up of a series of decisions made by the government, hospitals, private
payers, insurance companies, and even the patient’s employer—picks
unsurprising winners and unsuspecting losers.2 That path, complicated as it may
seem, ultimately turns a patient who could not afford her surgery or emergency
room visit into a defendant:3 from mission to adversary.
It is this end scene—with a hospital garnishing the wages of a patient who
does not know why she has been sued,4 or a corporate health system applying a
lien to a property and taking nearly $40,000 in proceeds of the sale of a house to
pay a thirteen-year-old medical bill of a now-deceased relative,5 or even a
university placing an enrollment hold on a college student’s account for unpaid
medical bills following a bout with lupus6—that seems more like a product of a
disordered series of cascading failures than a well-planned financing system
acting as designed. It is the grand finale, the final act, of the health care nonsystem’s relentless melodrama.
The story is at once both simple and complicated. Americans know
hospitals are highly expensive: of all individual contributors to costs in the

2. Whether a hospital is qualified as a non-profit or not leads to major differences in the availability of
patient financial assistance and the application of fair pricing rules. Professor Erin Fuse Brown refers to this
game of chance as “fairness roulette.” See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Fair Hospital Prices Are Not Charity:
Decoupling Hospital Pricing and Collection Rules from Tax Status, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 509, 511, 538–
41 (2016).
3. See e.g., Paul Kiel, From the E.R. to the Courtroom: How Nonprofit Hospitals Are Seizing Patients’
Wages, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofit-hospitalsare-seizing-patients-wages (“Northwest first sued Keith and Katie Herie when they couldn’t afford the $14,000
bill for Katie’s emergency appendectomy. While Northwest was seizing Keith Heries’ [sic] pay for that suit, it
sued him again over another hospital visit. Since 2006, the Heries have paid almost $20,000 and still owe at least
$26,000, with interest mounting.”).
4. Selena Simmons-Duffin, When Hospitals Sue for Unpaid Bills, It Can Be “Ruinous” for Patients, NPR
(June 25, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/06/25/735385283/hospitals-earnlittle-from-suing-for-unpaid-bills-for-patients-it-can-be-ruinous (“On a sunny morning—the second Friday in
June—the first defendant at court is a young woman, Daisha Smith, 24, who arrives early; she has just come off
working an overnight shift at a group home for the elderly. She is here because the local hospital sued her for an
unpaid medical bill—a bill she didn’t know she owed until her wages started disappearing out of her paycheck.”).
5. Jay Hancock, UVA Health Still Squeezing Money from Patients — By Seizing Their Home Equity,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 19, 2020), https://khn.org/news/uva-health-property-liens-patient-medical-debt
(“UVA Health treated Hutchinson’s brother for heart disease in the early 2000s. The unpaid bill was $24,868.
The system laid claim to their mother’s home because he was one of her heirs. The claim is up to $38,000 now,
she said, because of interest charges. Hutchinson has been disputing it for more than a year.”).
6. Jay Hancock & Elizabeth Lucas, ‘UVA Has Ruined Us’: Health System Sues Thousands of Patients,
Seizing Paychecks and Putting Liens on Homes, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
health/uva-has-ruined-us-health-system-sues-thousands-of-patients-seizing-paychecks-and-putting-liens-onhomes/2019/09/09/5eb23306-c807-11e9-be05-f76ac4ec618c_story.html.
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United States, hospital expenditures are the largest.7 In 2020, hospital
expenditures reached more than $1.2 trillion, outpacing general growth
patterns.8 From 2007 to 2014, hospital inpatient prices rose 42%.9 And
Americans—individually—are increasingly asked to foot the bill.10 In the face
of these trends, hospitals have shifted from patient care to debt collection.
This move has an expected effect on American health care access: excess
costs cause American patients to avoid care because they are afraid to go to the
hospital.11 This trend has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic; with
millions of Americans out of work over the last two years, more are avoiding
seeking necessary health care.12 During a pandemic, it seems that only in the
United States would patients be avoiding the hospital—not due to a contagious
and deadly pathogen, but because of the cost of American health care.13
As this Article argues, when hospitals sue patients, hospitals harm the
public’s health by deterring patients from seeking future care and worsening
patients’ social determinants of health. They do this by increasing the likelihood
of medical bankruptcy or a loss of housing or personal relationships.14 The
lawsuits lay bare the failure of health policy and the mismatch of the consumer
paradigm to American health care.15 They also illustrate gaps and holes in health
care financing, implicating quirks in how differently we think of medical
necessity depending on the identity of the payer, and the flop of moral hazard.16
All of this, rather predictably, leads to a breakdown of patient trust, exacerbated
and stressed by a devastating COVID-19 pandemic.17
Much of the scholarly focus in this space has been on whether hospitals are
adequately treated as publicly-minded entities and whether their non-profit tax
status is defensible. This Article adds to this literature and broadens it, making

7. Greg Rosalsky, How Non-Profit Hospitals Are Driving Up the Cost of Health Care, NPR: PLANET
MONEY (Oct. 15, 2019, 6:31 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/10/15/769792903/how-nonprofit-hospitals-are-driving-up-the-cost-of-health-care.
8. National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.
9. Zack Cooper, Stuart Craig, Martin Gaynor, Nir J. Harish, Harlan M. Krumholz & John Van Reenen,
Hospital Prices Grew Substantially Faster than Physician Prices for Hospital-Based Care in 2007–14,
38 HEALTH AFFS. 184, 184 (2019).
10. See ROBIN A. COHEN & EMILY P. ZAMMITTI, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE
HEALTH PLAN ENROLLMENT AMONG ADULTS AGED 18–64 WITH EMPLOYMENT-BASED INSURANCE COVERAGE
(2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db317.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Jeff Lagasse, More than Half of Americans Have Avoided Medical Care Due to Cost,
HEALTHCARE FIN. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/more-half-americans-haveavoided-medical-care-due-cost.
12. Reed Abelson, Why People Are Still Avoiding the Doctor (It’s Not the Virus), N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/health/coronavirus-insurance-healthcare.html.
13. See id.
14. See Discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part III.A.
15. See Discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part III.B.
16. See Discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part III.C.
17. See Discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part III.D.
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the argument that hospitals’ lawsuits against their patients—because of their
devastating impacts—must end. The impact of hospital lawsuits—whether from
non-profit or for-profit entities—has dramatic and deleterious effects on
interlocking layers of health care finance, delivery, and access. This Article
argues that legal and ethical solutions, using other legal and ethical teachings,
can be marshaled and recalibrated to put an end to these lawsuits.
The argument unfolds in four parts. Part I presents the precipitating
factors—from market saturation to the limits of public financing, to increasingly
brittle private insurance. Part II documents the strategies that hospitals have
adopted as they relate to litigating against former patients. Part III shows a
typology of the cascading harms that result when hospitals sue patients,
culminating in a destruction of patient trust in the health care system. Finally,
Part IV presents concluding thoughts on the way forward, with ideas on
empowering law and ethics in an effort to bring this practice to a close.
I. PRECIPITATING FACTORS
From a systemic perspective, what forces these former patients and
relatives of former patients to trek to the county courthouse as defendants is
comprised of a tangled list of factors. Some of these factors are submerged and,
as such, are not readily ascertainable by the typical patient.18 Some are
discoverable, but not obvious. Some, simply, are not salient. Others may be
observable or expected, but—in recognition of the ineffective paradigm of
health care as a consumer good and of patients as consumers19—so many
American patients are taken by surprise by their causes.
These related factors include both (1) the price inputs—the factors that lead
to a hospital requiring more out of the patients it treats, and (2) a degradation of
protections that once insulated patients from the full brunt of the cost of their
health care. Specifically, four of these cost-impacting factors are explored more
deeply below: (1) a consolidation of hospital markets and the resulting
increasing prices across the country; (2) a decline of public funding; (3) the
ineffectiveness of insurance to serve as a reliable cost control; and (4) a
dissolution of health insurance protections due to both employer cutbacks and
anti-patient reforms.

18. See ERIC LOPEZ, TRICIA NEUMAN, GRETCHEN JACOBSON & LARRY LEVITT, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
HOW MUCH MORE THAN MEDICARE DO PRIVATE INSURERS PAY? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2020),
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-much-more-than-medicare-do-private-insurers-pay-a-review-ofthe-literature.
19. See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926, 1935
(2019) (presenting the failure of consumer-based policies in American health care).
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A. PRICING WITH IMPUNITY
A discussion of hospital pricing must start with market power.20 Over the
last decade, health care markets have become increasingly saturated; by 2016,
90% of metropolitan areas “had highly concentrated hospital markets.”21 As the
health care marketplace has consolidated and hospitals have secured increasing
amounts of market share, prices have risen.22 A familiar story follows—when
hospitals consolidate, prices rise.23
A number of other studies demonstrate this. One has concluded that “prices
at monopoly hospitals are 12 percent higher than those in markets with four or
more rivals.”24 Another found, after looking at the highest-consolidated markets
between 2010 and 2013, that “the price of an average hospital stay soared, with
prices in most areas going up between 11 percent and 54 percent in the years
afterward.”25 Other studies have concluded that mergers have led to price
increases of 7% and 9%, respectively.26 In short, a “wide body of research has
shown that provider consolidation leads to higher health care prices for private
insurance.”27 With nearly 75% of hospital markets across the country deemed
“highly concentrated,” there has clearly been an impact on health care pricing.28
As applied to the prices of common and specific procedures, hospitals in
concentrated markets have been found to charge 25% more for coronary
angioplasties, 13% more for cardiac rhythm management device insertion, and
nearly 20% more for total knee replacements.29 They charge 24% more for total
hip replacements, 19% more for lumbar spine fusions, and 23% more for
cervical spine fusions.30 To make matters worse, the foregoing belief in one of
20. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 93 (2015)
(“[V]ariations in hospital prices are dictated by market power of the hospital, not the hospital’s costs, payer mix,
quality, or whether it is a teaching hospital.”).
21. Health Care Market Concentration Trends in the United States: Evidence and Policy Responses,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/journal-article/2017/sep/
health-care-market-concentration-trends-united-states.
22. John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 280 (2016) (“[M]any
retrospective studies have found that hospital mergers led to higher prices.”).
23. See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY (2020),
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/mar20_entirereport_sec.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
24. Zack Cooper, Stuart V. Craig, Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenan, The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital
Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured, 134 Q. J. ECON. 51, 51 (2019).
25. Reed Abelson, When Hospitals Merge to Save Money, Patients Often Pay More, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/health/hospital-mergers-health-care-spending.html.
26. Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of Cross-Market Mergers: Theory and
Evidence from the Hospital Industry, 50 RAND J. ECON. 286, 286 (2019).
27. Karyn Schwartz, Eric Lopez, Matthew Rae & Tricia Neuman, What We Know About Provider
Consolidation, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2020), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/what-we-knowabout-provider-consolidation.
28. Allison Inserro, Nearly 75% of US Hospital Markets Highly Concentrated, HCCI Report Shows, AJMC
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.ajmc.com/view/nearly-75-of-us-hospital-markets-highly-concentrated-hccireport-shows.
29. James C. Robinson, Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in Orthopedic Surgery
and Interventional Cardiology, 17 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 241, 241 (2011).
30. Id.
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the main arguments in favor of hospital consolidation—that it improves
quality—has recently been called into serious question.31
It is not a surprise that hospital consolidation results in higher health care
prices. As in any other market, hospitals with powerful leverage—and
particularly hospitals that are part of systems with large market shares32—have
the ability to negotiate higher rates with payers than those that do not.33
In an effort to combat the worst effects of market consolidation and
increase price transparency for patients, a new U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) rule now requires hospitals to publicly disclose and
provide patients “in a consumer-friendly manner” negotiated rates for a list of
hundreds of health care services.34 The American Hospital Association (AHA)
sued HHS to enjoin its implementation,35 but was unsuccessful,36 and the rule
took effect on January 1, 2021.37
B. THE PUBLIC FUNDING SQUEEZE
The publicly-funded programs of Medicare and Medicaid are becoming
less profitable—and perhaps, not at all profitable—for hospitals. As a result,
privately-funded insurance plans make up an increasing share of hospitals’
revenues.38 A recent study found that moving all payers to Medicare rates would
cause hospital revenues to plummet 35%.39 Lower Medicaid reimbursement

31. See Austin Frakt, Hospital Mergers Improve Health? Evidence Shows the Opposite, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/11/upshot/hospital-mergers-hurt-health-care-quality.html.
32. Dave Barkholz, Data Suggest New York Hospital Prices Depend on Leverage, Not Quality, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 19, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161219/NEWS/
161219910/data-suggest-new-york-hospital-prices-depend-on-leverage-not-quality (“Hospitals with bargaining
muscle in New York are getting paid 1.5 to 2.7 times as much for care by insurers as the lowest-priced hospitals
in the same market, a new study shows.”).
33. Interestingly but unsurprisingly, recent studies have shown—at least as it relates to doctors and other
providers—that insurance companies with larger market share are better able to demand lower prices than those
with smaller market share. See Eric T. Roberts, Michael E. Chernew & J. Michael McWilliams, Market Share
Matters: Evidence of Insurer and Provider Bargaining Over Prices, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 141, 141 (2017).
34. Transparency in Coverage Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,158, 72,158 (Nov. 12, 2020) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 147, 158).
35. Robert King, Appeals Court Skeptical of AHA in Lawsuit over HHS Price Transparency Rule, FIERCE
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 15, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/hospitals/appeals-court-skepticalaha-lawsuit-over-hhs-price-transparency-rule (describing the appellate judges hearing the case as “very skeptical
of the hospital industry’s arguments”).
36. Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, Hospitals Sued to Keep Prices Secret. They Lost., N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/upshot/hospitals-lost-price-transparency-lawsuit.html.
37. Sarah O’Brien, Hospitals Must Now Post Prices Online (in Consumer-Friendly Format). Here’s How
You Can Benefit, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2021, 9:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/05/hospitals-must-now-posttheir-prices-online-how-consumers-may-benefit.html.
38. Michael E. Chernew, Andrew L. Hicks & Shivani Shah, Wide State-Level Variation in Commercial
Health Care Prices Suggests Uneven Impact of Price Regulation, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 791, 791 (2020) (finding
that “average hospital revenue would fall about 35 percent if commercial prices were limited to Medicare rates,
but this would vary widely by state”).
39. Id.
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rates have a major negative impact on access to health care for Medicaid
beneficiaries.40
The AHA has estimated that combined underpayments—that is, the
amount by which payment from the public programs of Medicare and Medicaid
was less than hospitals’ costs—totaled $75.8 billion in 2019.41 The majority of
this was due to underpayments from the Medicare program, but both programs
failed to reimburse hospitals at cost.42 Seemingly bucking this trend, in 2020,
Medicare made its highest reimbursement rate increases in years—amounting to
a $4.67 billion increase in payments to hospitals as part of its inpatient
prospective payment system update.43 But it is still unclear how this increase
will impact the overall Medicare reimbursement for hospitals.
And this was before the COVID-19 pandemic. When New York was
enduring the worst COVID-19 numbers in the world in the spring of 2020,44 the
$400 million cut that the New York Medicaid program was planning to make in
payments to its public hospitals was still making headlines.45 The cut was later
delayed.46 Both of these topics—the growing gaps between public and private
payers and the exacerbation of these trends by the COVID-19 pandemic—are
laid out in more detail below.
1. A “Hidden Subsidy”?
A number of recent studies have shown disparate reimbursement rates
between public and private payers for hospitals.47 Hospital reimbursement rates
for private payers, on average, are close to 200% of what Medicare pays.48 For
inpatient services, private insurance rates are about 189% of what Medicare

40. See ALISON BORCHGREVINK, ANDREW SNYDER & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE
HEALTH POL’Y, THE EFFECTS OF MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT RATES ON ACCESS TO DENTAL CARE 4 (2008),
https://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/CHCF_dental_rates.pdf (noting that provider participation
in Medicaid substantially increased following dental rate increases).
41. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET 2 (2021),
https://www.aha.org/system/files/media/file/2020/01/2020-Medicare-Medicaid-Underpayment-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Alex Kacik, Not-for-Profit Hospitals Stabilized by Medicare Pay Raise, DSH Cut Delays, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/providers/not-profit-hospitalsstabilized-medicare-pay-raise-dsh-cut-delays (noting that $4 billion in Medicaid DSH payment cuts were
delayed into late 2020).
44. Jennifer Millman, New York Has Most COVID-19 Cases in World, Deaths Top 7k as Curve Starts to
Flatten, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:39 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/new-york-has-mostcovid-19-cases-in-globe-cuomo-warns-of-more-death-even-as-curve-flattens/2366721.
45. See Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Jesse McKinley, N.Y. Hospitals Face $400 Million in Cuts Even as Virus
Battle Rages, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/nyregion/coronavirushospitals-medicaid-budget.html.
46. Michael Greenberg, The Costs of Cuomo’s Cuts, N. Y. REV. BOOKS (July 2, 2020),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/07/02/andrew-cuomo-budget-cuts (noting that “the $400 million
decrease in state Medicaid payments to public hospitals has been delayed, mainly because it threatened New
York’s eligibility for federal coronavirus funds”).
47. See LOPEZ, supra note 18.
48. Id.
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pays.49 And for outpatient services, the differences are even more stark—with
hospitals earning from private payers about 264% of what Medicare pays.50
These disparities show up in all sorts of medical procedures:
For a patient’s knee replacement, Medicare will pay a hospital $17,000. The
same hospital can get more than twice as much, or about $37,000, for the same
surgery on a patient with private insurance. Or take another example: One
hospital would get about $4,200 from Medicare for removing someone’s
gallbladder. The same hospital would get $7,400 from commercial insurers.51

Based on an extensive literature review, the differences among
reimbursement rates for hospitals—and particularly between private payers and
Medicare—are more striking than the differences among physician services.52
The gap between private payers and public payers appears to be widening,
leading to wariness from health care providers about the impact of “Medicare
for All” proposals.53 Indeed, there may be real concerns raised about the
adequate funding of single-payer proposals, particularly because they sweep
away private insurance reimbursement for hospitals, eliminating this crosssubsidy and causing dislocation to the reimbursement structure.54
Similarly, hospitals have been hostile to proposals to lower the Medicare
eligibility age to 60.55 Even though the proposal to lower Medicare eligibility is
politically popular, “[h]ospitals fear adding millions of people to Medicare will
cost them billions of dollars in revenue,” largely because the difference in
reimbursement rates between Medicare and private insurance plans.56 Other
policy interventions under consideration—such as a construction within the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of the so-called public option57—“would give more
people access to coverage with lower payments rates and premiums, while also
resulting in lower revenues for health care providers.”58

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Reed Abelson, Hospitals Stand to Lose Billions Under “Medicare for All,” N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/health/medicare-for-all-hospitals.html.
52. See LOPEZ, supra note 18.
53. See Abelson, supra note 51.
54. Isaac D. Buck, The Meaning of “Medicare-for-All,” 20 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 159, 189 (2020)
(“[W]hat makes Medicare so efficient now is that providers continue to participate in the Medicare program and
do not have to clamor for increasing reimbursement because they receive such substantial reimbursements from
private insurance.”).
55. Phil Galewitz, Biden Wants to Lower Medicare Eligibility Age to 60, but Hospitals Push Back, NPR
(Nov. 11, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/11/933522346/biden-wants-tolower-medicare-eligibility-age-to-60-but-hospitals-push-back.
56. Id.
57. See Margot Sanger-Katz, The Difference Between a “Public Option” and “Medicare for All”? Let’s
Define Our Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/upshot/medicare-for-allhealth-terms-sanders.html (defining such reform plans as making available the option for “middle-income,
working-age adults to choose a public insurance plan—like Medicare or Medicaid—instead of a private plan”).
58. See LOPEZ, supra note 18.
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These findings—that private payers are paying a lot more than public
payers—coincide with a trend of decreasing Medicare margins for hospitals.59
According to a Kaiser analysis, hospitals experienced a negative Medicare
margin of about 9% in 2018, which is down from negative margins closer to 5%
from 2010 to 2014.60 Negative margins even exist for the more efficiently run
hospitals, as they experienced a negative 2% margin in 2017 and 2018,
respectively.61 This is down from a positive 2% margin experienced between
2011 and 2013.62 Numbers from the AHA have demonstrated the same trends,
and, based on numbers from 2016, Medicare “pays hospitals about 87 cents for
every dollar of their costs, compared with private insurers that pay $1.45.”63
It is not in dispute that public payers pay less than private payers. And
although it seems as though a public funding squeeze would result in more
pressure on private payers, data suggest that there is an important caveat to
mention here.
Specifically, recent data suggests that mergers are causing higher profits,
not that low Medicare rates are causing higher private payer rates and
mergers.64 In a 2020 report, MedPAC noted that “[s]ome industry stakeholders
have posited that low Medicare margins are a driver of mergers and acquisitions
as hospitals seek to maintain their profitability by increasing efficiency and
increasing their ability to extract higher payments from commercial payers.”65
Nonetheless, “hospital profits on non-Medicare patients increased not only
enough to offset all Medicare losses, but by a greater amount such that hospital
all-payer profit margins are higher now than they were in the prior 20 years.”66
Indeed, according to MedPAC, “[b]ecause all-payer profits were highest
when Medicare margins were lowest, we can infer that the increase in
commercial prices was not done purely to offset Medicare losses.”67 In short,
hospitals’ price increases were too high to tell a clear causal story of Medicare
cutbacks leading to private insurance rate increases. Other studies have echoed
the finding that high hospital prices are not correlated with high numbers of
Medicare and Medicaid patients; in fact, a study of New York hospitals
concluded that hospitals with higher Medicare and Medicaid populations
actually charged private payers less.68 Public subsidies, and, as an example,
59. Susan Morse, Efficient Hospitals Operate on -2% Margins in Medicare Payments, MedPAC Reports,
HEALTHCARE FIN. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/efficient-hospitals-operate2-margins-medicare-payments-medpac-reports (quoting MedPAC [Medicare Payment Advisory Commission]
Executive Director Dr. James Matthews as saying, “Medicare margins in the hospital sector have been negative
for some time now”).
60. See LOPEZ, supra note 18.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Abelson, supra note 51.
64. See MEDPAC, supra note 23, at 82.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 83.
67. Id.
68. See Barkholz, supra note 32.
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disproportionate share hospital (DSH) dollars, provide a non-public funding
stream for hospitals; cuts that were required under the ACA have been delayed.69
Currently, the scheduled DSH cuts would amount to $44 billion by 2025.70
2. The Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis
Indeed, these funding trends were well in place before the COVID-19
public health emergency. But in 2020, the pandemic increased enrollment in
Medicaid, which strained state budgets further.71 Between February and July of
2020, more than four million people were estimated to have been added to the
Medicaid rolls across the country,72 amounting to an enrollment growth of more
than 5%.73 Specifically, Medicaid enrollment grew more than 10% in Nevada,
Florida, Oklahoma, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Utah, and Kentucky.74
Recent expectations show that Medicaid enrollment is expected to increase more
than 8% in FY 2020-21.75
All of this is happening while states are still concerned about a rapid drop
in tax revenue due to the pandemic.76 While the most dire projections did not
pan out for FY 202077 largely due to assistance from the federal government and
the fact that wealthy residents have not been impacted as severely by the
pandemic,78 states have nonetheless imposed dramatic spending cuts.79 Most
expect substantial revenue declines lasting well into the 2021 and 2022 fiscal
69. See Kacik, supra note 43.
70. Rich Daly, Hospitals Get Relaxed Medicare Repayment Terms, Short Delay of DSH Cut in Federal
Funding Bill, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.hfma.org/topics/news/2020/10/
hospitals-get-relaxed-medicare-repayment-terms—short-delay-of-d.html.
71. Stephanie Armour, Medicaid Enrollment Surge During Pandemic Leaves States Looking for Cost Cuts,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/medicaid-enrollment-surge-duringpandemic-leaves-states-looking-for-cost-cuts-11606489203.
72. Gaby Galvin, Without Guarantee of Additional COVID-19 Aid, State Medicaid Directors Warn of
Painful Cuts Ahead, MORNING CONSULT (Sept. 17, 2020), https://morningconsult.com/2020/09/17/medicaidfmap-funding-states-coronavirus (Kentucky is estimated to have added 17.2% to its Medicaid enrollment).
73. Rich Daly, More Medicaid Programs Are Planning Inpatient Hospital Payment Cuts, HEALTHCARE
FIN. MGMT. ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.hfma.org/topics/news/2020/10/more-medicaid-programs-areplanning-inpatient-hospital-payment-c.html.
74. See Galvin, supra note 72.
75. See Armour, supra note 71.
76. Amanda Albright, States See $31 Billion of Taxes Disappear Due to Covid Recession, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 13, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-13/states-see-31-billion-of-taxesdisappear-due-to-covid-recession.
77. Editorial Board, State Tax Revenue Rebound, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2020, 6:15 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-tax-revenue-rebound-11605568517.
78. See Emily Badger, Alicia Parlapiano & Quoctrung Bui, Why Some States Are Seeing Higher Revenue
than Expected Amid Job Losses, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/
18/upshot/pandemic-surprising-state-revenue.html.
79. See, e.g., James Anderson, Colorado Governor Unveils State Budget Plan amid Pandemic, AP NEWS
(Nov. 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/technology-pandemics-virus-outbreak-colorado-jared-polis950b5a2be2db5342e9d872d933b2f6dc (“In this year’s coronavirus-shortened session, lawmakers cut $3.3
billion from the $13 billion general fund for the fiscal year that began July 1. Cuts included $621 million from
K-12 funding and $598 million from higher education.”).
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years.80 With his eye toward the future, President Biden, through his American
Rescue Plan, sought to bolster state funding, particularly focused on statefunded education.81
Adequate funding for the Medicaid program, a major part of state budgets,
also continues to be a concern. As part of the Families First Coronavirus
Response Act, the federal government bolstered FMAP percentages by 6.2%.82
This funding bump is to remain as long as the public health emergency
declaration is in place83 and has helped states that have faced budgetary
shortfalls84 to defer Medicaid cuts.85 Congress has also used this money to
incentivize states to maintain coverage levels and prevent cuts to coverage levels
for current beneficiaries.86
Nonetheless, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, some states have made
the decision to cut coverage and have suspended Medicaid coverage expansion
plans.87 Nevada, for example, passed a 6% Medicaid rate reduction, hoping to
save the state more than $50 million.88 Wyoming cut reimbursement rates for
“most providers” by 2.5%.89 And other states’ Medicaid programs, like Ohio’s,
are facing billions of dollars in shortfalls.90
80. States Grappling with Hit to Tax Collections, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-grappling-with-hit-to-tax-collections (with most
state estimates projecting between a 5 and 20% decline in the pre-COVID-19 revenue projections for FY 2021
and FY 2022).
81. President Biden Announces American Rescue Plan, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2021/01/20/president-biden-announces-americanrescue-plan. The plan also seeks to bump the federal government’s FMAP percentage for Medicaid for
administering COVID vaccinations. Id.
82. See AVIVA ARON-DINE, KYLE HAYES & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
WITH
NEED
RISING,
MEDICAID
IS
AT
RISK
FOR
CUTS
4
(2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-22-20health.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.; NPR Staff, States Are Broke and Many Are Eyeing Massive Cuts. Here’s How Yours Is Doing,
NPR (Aug. 3, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/03/893190275/states-are-broke-and-many-areeyeing-massive-cuts-heres-how-yours-is-doing; Scott Cohn, Cuts to Basic Services Loom as Coronavirus
Ravages Local Economies and Sends States into Fiscal Crisis, CNBC (July 7, 2020, 8:16 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/07/states-in-fiscal-crisis-cuts-to-basic-services-loom-due-to-pandemic.html.
85. See ARON-DINE ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 6 (noting that Nevada has “adopted a 6 percent across-the-board cut in payment rates for
hospitals, physicians, behavioral health providers, and long-term support services providers such as nursing
homes”).
88. See Megan Messerly, Medicaid Pushes Ahead with 6 Percent Rate Decrease Proposed During BudgetSlashing Special Session, NEV. INDEP. (Aug. 13, 2020, 2:00 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/
article/medicaid-pushes-ahead-with-6-percent-rate-decrease-proposed-during-budget-slashing-special-session;
see also John Sadler, Medicaid, Health, Education Bear Brunt of Nevada Lawmakers’ Cuts, LAS VEGAS SUN
(July 19, 2020, 8:25 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2020/jul/19/medicaid-health-budgets-bear-brunt-ofnevada-lawma.
89. See Galvin, supra note 72.
90. See Catherine Candisky, Ohio Medicaid Caseload Soars Due to COVID-19, but Now Program Faces
Budget Gap of Billions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 6, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.dispatch.com/story/
news/healthcare/2020/11/06/budget-shortfall-may-cause-cuts-ohios-tax-funded-medicaid-program-poordisabled-because-covid/6165391002.
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On top of the budgetary shortfalls, job losses as a result of the COVID-19
public health emergency are also likely to strain hospital expenditures further.
With millions of workers losing their employment and their accompanying
private health insurance, hospitals face the prospect of an increasing percentage
of uncompensated care due to the pandemic. At the same time, they face a surge
in the number of people needing health care, including heroic measures to save
their lives.91 A number of those will move from private insurance coverage to
Medicaid, likely shrinking the hospital’s revenue for their care.92 A recent study
estimates that, as of June of 2020, nearly 15 million Americans had lost
employer-based coverage since the beginning of the pandemic.93 This included
an estimated 7.7 million former workers and their nearly 7 million dependents.94
C. BRITTLE PRIVATE INSURANCE
Private health insurance—once a reliable protection against financial ruin
following a health care emergency—continues to disintegrate. Specifically,
many workers are seeing their employer-based health insurance—for years, the
gold standard for protecting workers’ and their families’ pocketbooks and health
status—rapidly unwinding. A 2020 Kaiser survey showed an annual premium
increase of 4%, year-over-year, for both individual health insurance and for
those covering their families.95 This outpaced wages, as those increased 3.4% in
2020.96 Remarkably, according to a survey, the average premium for coverage
for a family has now grown 22% over 5 years and 55% over 10 years.97 The
mean annual cost for a health insurance premium for a family was more than
$21,000 in 2020.98

91. See, e.g., Richard Harris, Advances in ICU Care Are Saving More Patients Who Have COVID-19, NPR
(Sept. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/20/914374901/advances-in-icucare-are-saving-more-patients-who-have-covid-19.
92. See Schwartz et al., supra note 27 (“KFF has estimated that by early May 2020, nearly 27 million
people were at risk of losing employer-sponsored coverage due to a job loss. About half of those individuals
were estimated to be eligible for Medicaid and about 30% were estimated to be eligible for subsidized
marketplace coverage. This shift from employer coverage to Medicaid alone will lead to lower revenues for
providers, because employer-sponsored insurance tends to reimburse at much higher rates than Medicaid.”).
93. See Ann Carrns, Even with Challenges of Pandemic, Health Benefits May Not Change Much, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/your-money/health-insurance-costdeductibles.html.
94. Id.
95. KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2020 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1 (2020),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2020-summary-of-findings (https://files.kff.org/attachment/Summaryof-Findings-Employer-Health-Benefits-2020.pdf).
96. See Alicia Adamczyk, Health Insurance Premiums Increased More than Wages This Year, CNBC
(Sept. 26, 2019, 3:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/26/health-insurance-premiums-increased-morethan-wages-this-year.html.
97. See EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2020 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 95, at 1.
98. See id.; see also Reed Abelson, Workers with Health Insurance Face Rising Out-of-Pocket Costs, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/health/health-insurance-premiumsdeductibles.html.
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Cost sharing also continues to increase for employees. The average
deductible for a single worker was $1,644 in 2020, which has increased 25%
over the last 5 years and 79% over 10 years.99 Now 83% of workers have a
deductible, and the average deductible among all covered workers amounts to
$1,364, up from $1,077 in 2015 and $646 in 2010.100
These increases have continued a trend: in its 2019 survey, Kaiser found
that from 2009 to 2019, while wages for Americans rose 26%, deductibles rose
162%.101 Even worse, it seems that the increased premiums required from
employees disproportionately impact lower-wage workers.102 This is on top of
the fact that “fewer workers at companies with large numbers of lower-wage
workers were eligible for coverage in the first place.”103
At the same time premiums and deductibles are rising,104 an increasing
number of Americans are enrolled in high-deductible health plans (HDHPs).105
This means that, as the raw costs of insurance are increasing and the percentage
of costs for which workers are responsible is growing, now the number of people
who are responsible for the growing percentage of those costs is also rising. The
CDC has found that more than 43% of non-elderly adults were enrolled in
HDHPs in 2017.106 Compare this to ten years before: according to CDC data,
enrollment in HDHPs in 2007 was only 14.8%.107
Now one in five employer-based health insurance beneficiaries have plans
with deductibles over $3,000 for individuals and $5,000 for families.108 Besides
sticking individuals with additional out-of-pocket expenditures following their

99. See EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2020 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 95, at 2.
100. Id. at 2–3.
101. See Greg Palosky & Sue Ducat, Benchmark Employer Survey Finds Average Family Premiums Now
Top $20,000, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/benchmarkemployer-survey-finds-average-family-premiums-now-top-20000 (“‘The single biggest issue in health care for
most Americans is that their health costs are growing much faster than their wages are,’ KFF President and CEO
Drew Altman said. ‘Costs are prohibitive when workers making $25,000 a year have to shell out $7,000 a year
just for their share of family premiums.’”).
102. See Michelle Andrews, As Health Care Costs Rise, Workers at Low-Wage Firms May Pay a Larger
Share, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://khn.org/news/health-care-costs-employer-surveyworkers-at-lower-wage-firms-may-have-higher-costs (“People at companies with large numbers of lower-wage
employees faced bigger deductibles for single coverage and were asked to pony up a larger share of their incomes
to pay premiums than those at firms with fewer people with low earnings . . . .”).
103. Id.
104. See Reed Abelson, Employer Health Insurance Is Increasingly Unaffordable, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/health/employer-health-insurance-cost.html (“Many
businesses have opted to increase deductibles instead of premiums.”).
105. Allison Inserro, Enrollment in High-Deductible Health Plans Continues to Grow, AM. J. MANAGED
CARE (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/view/enrollment-in-highdeductible-health-plans-continues-togrow.
106. See COHEN & ZAMMITTI, supra note 10, at 1.
107. See id.
108. Aimee Picchi, Higher Health Insurance Deductibles a Sickening Trend for Americans, CBS NEWS
(June 13, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/high-health-insurance-deductibles-a-sickeningtrend-thats-causing-financial-hardship.
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care, high deductibles can also deter individuals from seeking needed care,109
and even impact employment and professional decision-making,110 leading to
the questioning of the traditional economic wisdom supporting the inclusion of
these deductibles.111
Predictably, higher deductibles lead to more problems in paying bills.112
According to a 2016 analysis, those with higher deductibles were much more
likely to report difficulty in affording their medical bills than those with lower
deductibles.113 And while the number of uninsured Americans has dropped over
the last ten years,114 the number of insured Americans who are unable to afford
doctor’s visits, over the last twenty years, has risen from just over 7% to
11.5%.115 Health insurance coverage rates may have increased, but the insulation
of that coverage has shrunk at the same time.
Not only is employer-based insurance becoming less durable, but the
COVID-19 pandemic could have dramatic effects on America’s increasing
insurance rate. Throughout 2020, surging unemployment suggested a downward
trend of employer-based insurance.116 Aggravated by the pandemic, employers
were likely to be eyeing major cuts to health insurance for their workers in the
future.117

109. Id. (“Lianna Patch, a 29-year-old copywriter in New Orleans, said her $6,500 individual deductible
causes her to put off visits to her physician.”).
110. See Abelson, supra note 104.
111. See CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON, EXPOSED: WHY OUR HEALTH INSURANCE IS INCOMPLETE AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2019).
112. See LIZ HAMEL, MIRA NORTON, KAREN POLLITZ, LARRY LEVITT, GARY CLAXTON, AND MOLLYANN
BRODIE, KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 1–2 (2016), https://www.kff.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/8806-the-burden-of-medical-debt-results-from-the-kaiser-family-foundation-newyork-times-medical-bills-survey.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Jennifer Tolbert, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, Key Facts About the Uninsured Population,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsuredpopulation (the uninsured rate has dropped from 17.3% in 2009 to 10.9% in 2019).
115. Lisa Rapaport, Despite Insurance Gains, More People in the U.S. Can’t Afford Doctors, REUTERS (Jan.
27, 2020, 2:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-physicians-costs/despite-insurance-gains-morepeople-in-the-u-s-cant-afford-doctors-idUSKBN1ZQ2FA (“Out-of-pocket costs made doctors too expensive for
the uninsured, but costs also kept people with coverage from seeing physicians even when they had chronic
medical conditions requiring regular checkups.”).
116. See Adam Sonfield, Jennifer J. Frost, Ruth Dawson & Laura D. Lindberg, COVID-19 Job Losses
Threaten Insurance Coverage and Access to Reproductive Health Care for Millions, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Aug.
3, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200728.779022/full.
117. See Reed Abelson, Some Workers Face Looming Cutoffs in Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/health/covid-19-health-insurance.html (“Tens of millions of
people could lose their job-based insurance by the end of the year [2020], said Stan Dorn, the director of the
National Center for Coverage Innovation at Families USA, the Washington, D.C., consumer group.”).
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D. HEALTH INSURANCE AS A CO-CONSPIRATOR
While the edifice of health insurance coverage is crumbling for patients,
insurance and managed care leverage—important in holding down hospital
costs—also disintegrates when the sellers in a market are consolidating their
power.118 Consolidation in the industry creates powerful hospitals that “wield
considerable market clout when negotiating with health insurers, leading to
highly favorable rates that then push up insurance rates.”119 Given this
saturation, health insurers are unable to effectively hold down costs.120 There
has been theoretical support for the idea that the way to rein in hospital prices is
to allow insurance companies to acquire more market power.121
Nonetheless, supercharging insurers’ market power may not be the answer.
Instead, markets that feature dominant hospital systems and dominant health
insurers “may experience increases in both hospital prices and insurance
premiums,” with the dominant companies “agree[ing] to limit competition to
benefit both parties, with predictable harms to patient-consumers.”122 In this
way, large insurance companies and dominant hospital systems can agree to
avoid inflicting damage against one another, with the consumer paying in the
end.
Further, recent regulatory changes have likely made health insurance less
effective as a cost control. Specifically, ACA regulations may blunt insurance
companies’ natural incentive to hold down health care costs.123 This includes the
so-called Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), which requires health insurers to pay no
less than either 80 or 85% on health care or quality improvement.124 Under the
MLR ratio, insurance companies looking to grow gross profits are incentivized
to allow price increases to take hold.125 Indeed, when one’s profits are limited

118. See Eduardo Porter, Health Care’s Overlooked Cost Factor, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/examinations-of-health-costs-overlook-mergers.html (noting
that hospital mergers are a way to secure bargaining leverage with managed care organizations and insurance
companies).
119. John Aloysius Cogan, Jr., Health Insurance Rate Review, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 411, 427 (2016)
(“[H]ospitals and physicians can command greater prices from health insurers since those providers can threaten
to walk away from an insurer’s network, which could cause significant harm to the profitability of the health
insurer.”).
120. See, e.g., Lesley Stahl, How a Hospital System Grew to Gain Market Power and Drove Up California
Health Care Costs, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Dec. 13, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-sutterhealth-hospital-chain-high-prices-lawsuit-60-minutes-2020-12-13 (quoting a member of the San Francisco city
and county board of supervisors as saying, “Blue Shield is as at the whim of Sutter naming its price as we are.
For once in their life the insurance company is not the worst actor in the room, it’s Sutter”).
121. See Kirkwood, supra note 22, at 276–78 (“There is little doubt that a merger of substantial insurance
companies would result in lower provider prices.”).
122. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11, 29 (2014).
123. See Isaac D. Buck, Affording Obamacare, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 287 (2020).
124. Julie Appleby, Final Medical Loss Ratio Rule Rebuffs Insurance Agents, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec.
2, 2011, 2:40 PM), https://khn.org/news/final-medical-loss-ratio-rule-rebuffs-insurance-agents.
125. Buck, supra note 123, at 290.
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by a percentage of the money that it takes in, then increasing the company spend
(the size of the pie) is the primary way to increase raw profits.126
Within health insurance markets that are non-competitive—both for (1)
ACA individual markets that feature few competitors,127 and (2) employer-based
insurance that does not provide employees with much choice of what type of
insurance plan they ultimately select128—powerful incentives that improve
customer choice do not exist. Without the potent power of the market to push
insurance companies to compete on rates, in an uncompetitive market, those
companies have less of an incentive to hold down costs. Blunting the insurance
companies’ typical interests to hold down the cost of premiums could have an
impact on their incentives to hold down the inputs in the costs of care. Stories
abound of insurance companies that seem to be confusingly content with high
health care costs.129
E. RETROSPECTIVE DENIAL
Further, insurers’ use of tricky techniques have resulted in ballooning outof-pocket spending by patients.130 In late 2020, Congress was poised to end the
practice known as surprise billing, in which an episode of care surprisingly
involves an out-of-network provider, causing a much higher out-of-pocket bill
for the patient following care.131 It remains to be seen whether Congress’
intervention to address surprise billing amounts to an enduring solution.132
Regardless, other tricky techniques for those responsible for financing health
care remain.
Retrospective denials occur when the health insurance company, following
the administration of treatment, determines that the care was outside of the
126. See Marshall Allen, Why Your Health Insurer Doesn’t Care About Your Big Bills, NPR: SHOTS (May
25, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/05/25/613685732/why-your-healthinsurer-doesnt-care-about-your-big-bills (“It’s as if a mom told her son he could have 3 percent of a bowl of ice
cream. A clever child would say, ‘Make it a bigger bowl.’”).
127. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., PLAN YEAR 2021 QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN CHOICE
AND PREMIUMS IN HEALTHCARE.GOV STATES 4 (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/DataResources/Downloads/2021QHPPremiumsChoiceReport.pdf.
128. Caitlin Owens, Employers, Not Patients, Have the Most Health Insurance Choices, AXIOS (Jan. 21,
2020),
https://www.axios.com/employers-patients-private-health-insurance-63c2f9cf-a537-4bf7-af345dc040d07eb5.html.
129. See Allen, supra note 126 (“Widely perceived as fierce guardians of health care dollars, insurers, in
many cases, aren’t. In fact, they often agree to pay high prices, then, one way or another, pass those high prices
on to patients—all while raking in healthy profits.”).
130. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Coronavirus Tests Are Supposed to Be Free. The Surprise Bills Come Anyway.,
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/upshot/coronavirus-surprisetest-fees.html.
131. See Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, Surprise Medical Bills Cost Americans Millions. Congress Is
Finally Set to Ban Most of Them., N.Y TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/20/upshot/surprise-medical-bills-congress-ban.html.
132. See Susannah Luthi & Rachel Roubein, How Powerful Health Providers Tamed a “Surprise” Billing
Threat, POLITICO (Dec. 21, 2020, 7:44 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/21/surprise-billing-healthproviders-congress-449759.
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health insurance contract’s coverage scope.133 These often follow a prior
authorization, when an insurer gives preapproval, or certifies coverage, for a
certain procedure or product.134 Because prior authorizations can be timelimited, and because the prior authorization itself is not a promise to pay for a
procedure, health insurance companies can “change their minds after the fact—
citing treatments as medically unnecessary upon further review, blaming how
billing departments charged for the work or claiming the procedure was
performed too long after approval was granted.”135
Retrospective denials can also occur following care that did not require a
prior authorization in the first place, with an insurer—after the care is
provided—saying that it needed one after all.136 Similarly, these denials can also
occur where the insurance company—after care is received—determines that the
procedure or product in question was not medically necessary.137 These policies
have been deployed following emergency department care, drawing the ire of
emergency room physicians who argue that the policies will ultimately
encourage patients to delay needed care.138 Perhaps more odiously, however, is
that patients are not made aware of these policies before they consent to care in
the first place, leaving them stuck with a bill for an allegedly non-medically
necessary medical intervention, and no way to pay for it.
II. LITIGATION AS STRATEGY
After arriving by ambulance at the emergency department, Susan Bradshaw
lay on a gurney in her hospital gown with a surgical bonnet on her head,
waiting to be wheeled into surgery to remove her appendix at a hospital near
her home in Maitland, Florida. A woman in street clothes approached her.
Identifying herself as the surgeon’s office manager, she demanded that
Bradshaw make her $1,400 insurance payment before the surgery could
proceed.
“I said, ‘You have got to be kidding. I don’t even have a comb,’” Bradshaw,
a 68-year-old exhibit designer, told the woman on that night eight years ago.
“I don’t have a credit card on me.”

133. John V. Jacobi, Tara Adams Ragone & Kate Greenwood, Health Insurer Market Behavior After the
Affordable Care Act: Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 109, 130 (2015).
134. See Lauren Weber, Health Insurers Can Use This Loophole to Push Pricy Medical Bills onto You, the
Patient, USA TODAY: HEALTH (Feb. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/02/
06/retrospective-denial-how-health-insurance-practice-works/4671935002.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (“After the tests were performed, though, UnitedHealthcare told Pasagic it had deemed the tests
medically unnecessary and would not pay for them.”).
138. See Eli Richman, Anthem’s “Retrospective Denial” Policy for Emergency Care Puts Patients at Risk:
Study, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Oct. 22, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/anthem-sretrospective-denial-policy-at-ers-puts-patients-at-risk-study.
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The woman crossed her arms and Bradshaw remembers her saying, “You have
to figure it out.”139

A. BEFORE THE SUIT
Even though the courtroom is the setting of the most dramatic example of
the hospital’s effort to ensure collection on a hospital bill directly from an oftenunlawyered patient,140 hospitals engage in less draconian efforts to protect their
bottom lines. These efforts can begin before the patient leaves the hospital,141 or
even before its physicians have administered care to the patient.142 It has become
a strategic process with consequence, as hospitals have spent time on
streamlining collections and focus on collecting money from the patient early on
in the episode of care. In this vein, hospitals have engaged with patients,
educating them about their responsibility to pay143 or have assertedly sought to
set up a payment arrangement.144 Gone are the days when the hospital simply
asks patients for money, replaced instead with a strategic plan that aggressively
focuses on how to collect.145
One important consideration that hospitals have observed is that “patients
are more likely to pay before or during a hospital visit rather than after.”146 “Payand-chase,” which is defined by the practice of hospitals seeking payments after
the patient is discharged, seems increasingly ineffective.147 Hospitals now can
“run the patient’s credit card” and “set up payment plans at the bedside.”148
139. Michelle Andrews, Doctors and Hospitals Tell Patients: Show Us the Money Before Treatment, NPR
(Dec. 7, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/12/07/504589131/doctors-andhospitals-tell-patients-show-us-the-money-before-treatment.
140. See Bram Sable-Smith, A Wisconsin Hospital Promised to Stop Suing Most Patients During the
Pandemic. Then It Filed 200 Lawsuits., WIS. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 21, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://www.wpr.org/
wisconsin-hospital-promised-stop-suing-most-patients-during-pandemic-then-it-filed-200-lawsuits (“Gummow
navigated the lawsuit without a lawyer, believing she could not afford one. Most debt defendants lack legal
representation and don’t appear in court,” resulting in a default judgment for the hospital).
141. See Harris Meyer, Hospitals Get More Proactive About Bill Collection as Patients’ Ability to Pay
Deteriorates, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 28, 2016, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20160628/NEWS/160629910/hos…active-about-bill-collection-as-patients-ability-to-pay-deteriorates.
142. See Susan Morse, Hospitals Increasingly Using Credit Checks to Understand Whether Patients Will
Pay, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hospitalsincreasing-using-credit-checks-understand-whether-patients-will-pay.
143. Improving the Patient Payment Experience, 69 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 1, 2 (2015).
144. See Meyer, supra note 141 (“[A] growing number of hospitals are working aggressively with patients
before procedures or before they leave the hospital to work out payment.”).
145. See Jane A. Berkebile, Creating a Positive Culture for Collections, 67 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 100,
101 (2013), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24050060.
146. Melanie Evans, Cash Is King: More Hospitals and Systems Are Using Credit Scores and Financial
Records in Collection Strategies—and They’re Asking Patients to Pay Upfront, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 17,
2009), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090817/NEWS/908149996/cash-is-king.
147. See Julie Spitzer, A New Patient Engagement Model for Payment Collection, BECKER’S HOSP. REV.
(Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/a-new-patient-engagement-model-forpayment-collection.html (noting that “providers have to figure out how to get medical bills to be a priority for
consumers, and then, they must figure out how to create a sustainable collection model”).
148. Improving the Patient Payment Experience, supra note 143, at 3.
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“Imagine,” says one hospital revenue director, “if patients could pay their
healthcare bills like they pay their hotel bills . . . . Once the care episode
concludes and the insurance claim is adjudicated, the hospital would charge the
patient’s credit card for the remaining balance and e-mail a receipt.”149 One
wonders which patients, exactly, would be clamoring for such a system. Another
hospital executive has noted that if patients feel as though a hospital payment
system “is straightforward and easy,” then it “can give the provider an advantage
over the competition.”150 As if patients choose hospitals for their ease of billing
practices.
Unsurprisingly, hospitals have gotten increasingly creative in their efforts.
A hospital in Virginia mails bills “under the name of its own collections
arm . . . which exists only on letterhead,” based on a belief that patients are most
likely to pay bills that “stand out from hospital bills.”151 Analysts have also
encouraged that hospitals adopt a so-called “propensity payment model, which
calculates the odds a patient will pay,” based on “balance due, past behavior,
and demographics.”152 This can assist the hospital in figuring out where to direct
its focus when collecting.
Hospitals have also used credit checks to identify the likelihood that a
patient is able to pay for a hospital bill.153 In-depth and seemingly intrusive
checks, including “lifestyle choices, such as frequent pizza purchases, cigarette
buying habits, a fall-off in buying prescription drug refills or a lack of vehicle
registration[,]” can also be utilized.154 Hospital vendors reportedly look into
patients’ social media presences, health choices, and purchase histories.155 These
efforts can identify who needs access to hospitals’ financial assistance
programs.156 They can also identify who is an insured patient with the ability to
pay.157
Some big players in the hospital industry have even gotten involved in the
lucrative business of debt collection.158 Subsidiaries of large for-profit hospital

149. Id. at 4.
150. Id. at 3. “Patient balances stand to grow in the future, and hospitals will be continuing their efforts to
capture money efficiently and effectively. Payment plans are also probably going to get bigger and more creative.
I can even see payment processes becoming similar to those in other service industries.” Id. at 4.
151. Evans, supra note 146.
152. Spitzer, supra note 147.
153. See Morse, supra note 142.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Beth Kutscher, Patient-Friendlier Financing? Hospitals and Vendors Tout New No-Interest
Payment Plans, MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 2, 2014); see also Evans, supra note 146 (“Credit scores also allow
hospitals to triage unpaid bills and focus collection efforts on those most likely to pay when reminded.”).
157. See Evans, supra note 146 (“It is insured patients with available resources who Fleischer says she hopes
to target with earlier credit screening . . . . Without a down payment, ‘you’re choosing not to have your
healthcare today because you’re choosing not to pay your financial obligation,[’] Fleischer says.”).
158. See John Tozzi, A Hospital Giant Discovers that Collecting Debt Pays Better than Curing Ills,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2017, 2:00 AM PST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-18/ahospital-giant-discovers-that-collecting-debt-pays-better-than-curing-ills.

February 2022

WHEN HOSPITALS SUE PATIENTS

211

chains like HCA Healthcare and Tenet Healthcare operate profitably within the
debt collection world.159 Still, other hospitals sell their debt to buyers, perhaps
because they “don’t want their good names associated with aggressive debtcollection tactics.”160
When hospitals demand up-front payment, patients are too often left
scrambling. In order to satisfy the hospital’s ask, patients enter into monthly
payment plans or an arrangement, for example, that they will use recently
disbursed graduate student loans or a friend’s credit card for a hysterectomy or
appendix removal.161 According to a recent survey, one in eight Americans had
to borrow money to afford health care, amounting to $88 billion in borrowed
funds.162 And as of 2017, 43 million Americans owed $75 billion in past-due
medical debt.163 It is no wonder that 45% of Americans worry that they could be
bankrupted by a medical emergency.164
Nonetheless, seemingly marrying this inability to pay with the hospitals’
desire to collect quickly, a particularly attractive option for hospitals seems to
be encouraging patients to open credit cards to pay for medical care, enticing
them with a 0% interest rate165 or other payment plans featuring loans.166 Credit
cards may allow the hospital to either get paid immediately167 or to receive a
down payment.168 Adopting these payment plans has led to greater collections
by hospitals.169 But patients need to be very careful. Missing payments can
damage one’s credit score.170

159. Id.
160. Olga Khazan, What Happens When You Don’t Pay a Hospital Bill, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/08/medical-bill-debt-collection/596914 (documenting the
lengths debt collection agencies undertaken to collect on medical debt, including resorting to LinkedIn requests).
161. See Andrews, supra note 139.
162. Tami Luhby, Americans Borrow $88 Billion Annually to Pay for Health Care, Survey Finds, CNN
(Apr. 2, 2019, 12:28 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/health/health-care-costs-borrowing/index.html.
163. Tozzi, supra note 158.
164. The U.S. Healthcare Cost Crisis, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/248081/westhealth-gallup-ushealthcare-cost-crisis.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
165. See Kutscher, supra note 156.
166. See Jeff Lagasse, Healthcare Turns to Zero-Interest Loans to Give Patients a Better Reason to Pay,
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (May 3, 2017), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/healthcare-turns-zerointerest-loans-give-patients-better-reason-pay.
167. See OFF. OF THE MINN. ATT’Y GEN., HEALTH CARE CREDIT CARDS, https://www.ag.state.mn.us/
Brochures/pubHealthCareCreditCards.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (“When a patient charges services on a
health care credit card, the clinic is paid right away by the credit card company, even if the services are to be
delivered in the future.”); Ellen Cannon, Medical Credit Cards Are Costly If You’re Not Careful, NERDWALLET
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/credit-cards/medical-credit-card.
168. See Lagasse, supra note 166.
169. Id.
170. See Jo Ling Kent & Michael Cappetta, Some Hospitals Will Now Offer You an Interest-Free Loan,
NBC NEWS (May 25, 2017, 1:10 PM PST), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/some-hospitalswill-now-offer-you-interest-free-loan-n764236 (“If patients take out a loan from the hospital, reading the fine
print is essential—failing to make payments could result in fines and penalties, as well as damage to credit
scores.”).
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For instance, CareCredit, a common credit card option for patients,171 says
it is accepted by more than 225,000 providers across the United States.172 Its
website notes that the card can be used at hospital and surgical centers and for
labs, imaging and radiology, pharmacy, and specialty care.173 According to the
company website, the cards offer no-interest financing for short-term payoffs
(up to 24 months) “when [the patient] make[s] the minimum monthly payments
and pay[s] the full amount due by the end of the promotional period.”174
Longer-term financing, ranging in length from 24- to 60-month periods,
offers interest rates between 14.9% and 17.9%.175 Failure to pay off the full
amount by the end of the promotional period results in the addition of deferred
interest (with a reported interest rate of 26.99%) to the amount owed.176 Failure
to maintain payments or to satisfy the debt negatively affects the borrower’s
credit score.177
According to CareCredit, customers are “using their card for copayments,
deductibles, and prescriptions as out-of-pocket costs continue to rise.”178 While
this financing plan may work for some patients, the patient is financing the cost
of their care and will likely be responsible for interest if unable to pay off the
full balance. This creates a situation in which, because the patient is unable to
pay for the deductible, for instance, they seek to spread out the bill over time to
be better able to satisfy it. This financing lifeline can quickly become a highwire act.
B. FROM PATIENT TO DEFENDANT
Even though the number of hospitals pursing aggressive litigation
techniques is small179 and many hospitals have reportedly wound down their
litigious behavior,180 reports suggest that some have continued to sue to collect

171. See Evans, supra note 146. According to its website, CareCredit has over 11 million customers. About
CareCredit, CARECREDIT, https://www.carecredit.com/about (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
172. What Makes CareCredit Different, CARECREDIT, https://www.carecredit.com/howcarecreditworks/
prospective (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
173. Using CareCredit at Hospitals and Surgical Centers, CARECREDIT, https://www.carecredit.com/
surgery-centers (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
174. What Makes CareCredit Different, supra note 172.
175. Id.
176. Morse, supra note 142.
177. See Casey Bond & Chris Kissell, Medical Credit Cards: Should You Apply?, U.S NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Feb. 20, 2020), https://creditcards.usnews.com/articles/what-is-a-medical-credit-card.
178. About CareCredit, supra note 171.
179. See Tara Bannow, Few Hospitals Aggressively Sue Patients to Pay Bills, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct.
5, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/revenue-cycle/few-hospitals-aggressively-sue-patientspay-bills.
180. Id.
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for unpaid medical bills, even during the pandemic.181 These stories are as
shocking as they are harrowing.182
Northwell Health, which reversed its legal strategy in January 2021,
pledging that “it would stop suing patients during the pandemic and would
rescind all legal claims it filed in 2020,” had sued 14,000 patients from 2015 to
2019.183 Similarly, Ballad Health has filed more than 44,000 lawsuits against
patients since 2009.184
These reports of lawsuits include a number of conscience-shocking stories,
from a health system that has placed a lien on a home to secure payment for
$164,000 following an emergency surgery,185 to one that has sued a mom of four
children for the $2,498 that she owed following a teenager’s back surgery,186 to
another that has seized about 25% of its former patient’s paycheck, making her
unable to pay rent following treatment she received after a fall, a car accident,
and other maladies.187 Further, an undergraduate student had his student
registration blocked because he was unable to pay for care he received at the
university health center.188 Another has attracted attention for its new policy that
it would end litigation against even its own employees for their medical bills that
it is owed.189
The claims against defendants give the hospital an entry point into the
judicially-enforced debt collection process.190 Indeed, given that “patients
typically don’t show up to their court date,” default judgments against the
defendant allow the hospitals “to start garnishing their patients’ wages” and
apply liens to personal property.191 According to a study in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, 36% of Virginia hospitals sued their patients or
181. See Caitlin Owens, Hospitals Still Suing Patients in Coronavirus Hotspots, AXIOS (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/hospitals-lawsuits-patients-coronavirus-7133bf3e-4fab-4880-93ff-246ec0c4b0fc.html.
182. See, e.g., Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6 (noting that the University of Virginia Health System sued
patients more than 36,000 times from 2012 to 2018 for a total of $106 million); Sarah Kliff, With Medical Bills
Skyrocketing, More Hospitals Are Suing for Payment, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/08/us/hospitals-lawsuits-medical-debt.html (noting that Ballad hospital system filed “at least 44,000
lawsuits from 2009 to 2019”).
183. Kliff, supra note 182 (Northwell was found to have “sued patients far more often than any other
hospital chain”).
184. Id.
185. Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6.
186. Kliff, supra note 182.
187. See Alex MacGillis, One Thing the Pandemic Hasn’t Stopped: Aggressive Medical-Debt Collection,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2020, 2:05 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/one-thing-the-pandemic-hasntstopped-aggressive-medical-debt-collection.
188. See Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6.
189. See Wendi C. Thomas & Deborah Douglas, “Humbled”: Nonprofit Christian Hospital Dials Back
Aggressive Debt Collection and Raises Wages After Our Investigation, PROPUBLICA (July 30, 2019, 6:28 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/methodist-le-bonheur-healthcare-debt-collection-raised-wages-policychange-after-mlk50-propublica-investigation.
190. See Michael Barbaro, Why So Many Hospitals Are Suing Their Patients, N.Y. TIMES: THE DAILY
PODCAST (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/podcasts/the-daily/medicare.html.
191. Id.
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garnished their patients’ wages in 2017.192 Of the hospitals that sued or
garnished, 71% were non-profit hospitals.193
That hospitals are suing patients for uncollected bills can be warily treated
as just another step in, or yet another example of, the failure of the for-profit
American health care system. For their part, hospitals can argue that they need
to collect on bills to sustain their business models. And for some, particularly
those in dire financial straits given their states’ inability to expand the Medicaid
program under the ACA194 and the current public health crisis,195 the fact that
they have to turn to litigation against their own patients, is demonstrative of a
broken public financial system. In other words, hospitals may argue that all of
this is not their fault.196
When asked why they sue patients, hospitals generally raise two
arguments: first, the lawsuits are necessary to prevent patients from skipping out
on bills that they have fairly incurred,197 and second, the lawsuits are of the
patient’s making because of some failure to avail themselves of the financial
assistance that all hospitals provide. These both give the impression that the
hospital really has no choice but to sue their patients.
Northwell Health, a focus of reporting by The New York Times for filing
thousands of lawsuits against its patients even after the start of the COVID-19
pandemic, has made this argument.198 Northwell’s chief business strategy
officer was reported to have defended the lawsuits, arguing that the health
system was owed the bills, and had a right to collect.199 “We have no interest in
pursuing these cases legally,” he said, explaining that “[i]t’s not what we want
to do.”200 And “[u]nfortunately, in some cases, they’re not leaving us much of
an option.”201 One may assume he is intimating that patients are not giving the
hospital system any choice but to sue them because they are not paying for their
care.

192. William E. Bruhn, Lainie Rutkow, Pieqi Wang, Stephen E. Tinker, Christine Fahim, Heidi N. Overton
& Martin A. Makary, Prevalence and Characteristics of Virginia Hospitals Suing Patients and Garnishing
Wages for Unpaid Medicaid Bills, 322 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N. 691, 692 (2019).
193. Id.
194. See Ge Bai & Gerard F. Anderson, COVID-19 and the Financial Viability of US Rural Hospitals,
HEALTH AFFS. (July 1, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200630.208205/full.
195. See Lauren Coleman-Lochner, John Tozzi, & Jeremy Hill, Virus Pushes America’s Hospitals to the
Brink of Financial Ruin, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2020, 2:00 PM PST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-05-08/virus-pushes-america-s-hospitals-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin (noting that hospitals were
expected to post losses of more than $200 billion by the end of June 2020).
196. See Brian M. Rosenthal, One Hospital System Sued 2,500 Patients After Pandemic Hit, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/nyregion/coronavirus-medical-debt-hospitals.html.
197. See Blake Farmer, It’s Not Just Hospitals that Sue Patients Who Can’t Pay, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Feb. 21, 2020), https://khn.org/news/its-not-just-hospitals-that-sue-patients-who-cant-pay.
198. Rosenthal, supra note 196.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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A similar statement has been shared by Community Health Systems, noting
that “[s]ometimes legal action is the only path through which patients will
engage in a conversation about the amount they owe for healthcare services that
have already been provided.”202 Methodist Le Bonheur, which sued more than
8,000 patients from 2014 to 2018, has stated that “[o]utstanding patient debts are
only sent to collections and then to court as a very last resort, and only after
continued efforts to work with the patients have been exhausted.”203
Ballad Health is another hospital network that has pursued a strategy of
suing its patients.204 Tracking Northwell, its vice president for system
innovation was quoted as saying that Ballad is “only pursuing patients who have
the means to pay but choose not to pay.”205 Similarly, Carlsbad Medical Center
was also highlighted as a hospital that has adopted a similarly aggressive
strategy, filing more than 3,000 lawsuits from 2015 to 2019.206 Carlsbad’s CEO
stated:
‘We sue less than one percent of the patients who receive care at our
hospital . . . . Litigation is always the last resort when our hospital attempts to
collect what it is owed for the services we provide. Before initiating a
collection suit against anyone, we make multiple attempts—usually trying to
contact our patients ten to twelve times—to offer manageable payment plans
and additional discounts off of already discounted charges. In many cases,
patients do not respond to our calls or letters.’207

Other spokespeople for hospitals have highlighted the fact that financial
assistance is available for patients.208
Typically, patients receive more than a dozen contacts via mail or phone call
along with multiple opportunities to file for medical or financial hardship. At
all points in that process, patients are encouraged to speak with financial
counselors; their bills will be forgiven if they can show financial hardship or
inability to pay.209

202. Owens, supra note 181.
203. Wendi C. Thomas, The Nonprofit Hospital that Makes Millions, Owns a Collection Agency and
Relentlessly Sues the Poor, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
methodist-le-bonheur-healthcare-sues-poor-medical-debt.
204. Kliff, supra note 182.
205. Id.
206. Laura Beil, As Patients Struggle with Bills, Hospital Sues Thousands, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/health/carlsbad-hospital-lawsuits-medical-debt.html.
207. Elizabeth Cohen & John Bonifield, When Some Patients Don’t Pay, This Hospital Sues, CNN: HEALTH
(Sept. 10, 2019, 5:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/10/health/carlsbad-new-mexico-hospitaleprise/index.html; see also Owens, supra note 181 (presenting the Community Hospital Systems statement that
notes “[l]egal action is always the last avenue considered”).
208. See MacGillis, supra note 187.
209. Id.
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According to hospitals, patients “have to cooperate” and must “give [them]
the information to confirm what they wrote on their application [for financial
assistance].”210
The arguments that hospitals’ lawsuits and garnishing wages are “a last
resort” have been raised for years, as hospital lawsuits continue to garner
attention.211 Unfortunately, it appears that these lawsuits—in which a publiclymissioned institution seeks to plug a public funding hole by targeting the very
people who the benefit of public financing is designed to help—is not cabined
to the health care space. Recent reporting has spotlighted public housing
associations turning to litigation to recover unpaid rent,212 and school districts
suing families for unpaid textbook213 and school fees.214
III. A SIGNAL OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
Regardless of the success of the credit card and debt collection market and
notwithstanding the statements of hospital CEOs, that hospitals have moved
toward litigation signals a catastrophic failure in the financing of American
health care. It demonstrates the misfit and tragic ultimate consequence of the
consumer-based paradigm in the industry. It also spotlights the failure of law
and policy to adeptly and sufficiently intervene to prevent the worst of a
fragmented, for-profit system from hurting patients. And, on a fundamental
level, it lays bare the absence of any moral tethering from what hospitals do—
210. Jenny Gold, Sued Over an $1,800 Hospital Bill, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 27, 2012),
https://khn.org/news/charity-care-nonprofit-hospitals-patient-debt (presenting the story of a patient being
threatened with a lawsuit for bills following prenatal visits).
211. Id.
212. As has been reported, and in a hard-to-believe turn, there are examples of public housing associations
turning to litigation—against residents who qualify for public housing—to “bolster rent collection.” Danielle
Ohl, Talia Buford & Beena Raghavendran, She Was Sued over Rent She Didn’t Owe. It Took Seven Court Dates
to Prove She Was Right., PROPUBLICA (Aug. 25, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/she-wassued-over-rent-she-didnt-owe-it-took-seven-court-dates-to-prove-she-was-right. According to recent reporting,
in Annapolis, Maryland, in 2018, the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis filed 1,200 lawsuits against
public housing residents. Id. It sued 320 residents, “more than one-third of those who live in its units.” Id. The
court cases did not typically lead to eviction but were ruinous for residents’ credit scores. Id.
213. Similar reporting has shone a spotlight on Mishawaka, Indiana, and its school district that is suing
students’ families for unpaid textbook fees. As was reported:
School City of Mishawaka filed 202 lawsuits against parents, with 80 more in August. All told, court
records show the district has filed 294 cases since late March, which represents about 5 percent of
its enrollment of approximately 5,300 students in the 2019-20 school year.
Ellis Simani & Kim Kilbride, The Pandemic Hasn’t Stopped This School District from Suing Parents over
Unpaid Textbook Fees, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 12, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/thepandemic-hasnt-stopped-this-school-district-from-suing-parents-over-unpaid-textbook-fees. The chief financial
officer of the district has stated that the district says it has “an obligation to the parents who do pay their fees to
collect from those who don’t but appear to have the means to pay them.” Id.
214. A school district filed 200 cases against families in November of 2020 for unpaid fees. Id. As is often
the case, a bill for unpaid textbooks, or a $240 bill for candy bars as part of a school fundraiser becomes more
than $350 after the parent misses the court date. Id. Through these efforts, and by suing these families in court,
the school district seems to be attempting to make-up for a funding gap. Id. (noting that the chief financial officer
of one of the school districts “thinks the state should try to find a way to reimburse districts for textbooks”).
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taking care of the wellbeing of patients—and how they go about getting paid,
which turns their patients into adversaries.
For those steeped in consumerist solutions, given the squeeze that many
hospitals feel, and because those with private insurance have historically
enjoyed more robust and protective insurance than other patients coming into
the hospital, a hospital adopting an aggressive collection strategy may seem to
be emblematic of a noncontroversial attempt to fairly secure funds for care that
it has provided. If patients have received services, their insurance does not cover
those services, and, as a result, the hospital needs compensation, there is a
karmic simplicity to the process. The patient received a benefit and now must
pay. This is the crux of the consumer paradigm in American health care. And
treating American health care like any other consumer good lands us here.
But from a public health, health policy, and health care finance
perspective, the decision by hospitals to pursue their patients in court is radically
counterproductive to the goals and values of community health, health care
policy, and health care finance. This is aggravated when the hospital, the central
hub of health care delivery for so many, is the source of the patient’s pain.
First, hospital lawsuits are harmful to public health: put simply, they harm
the health of the patients they are suing and they deter patients from seeking
necessary care in the future.215 Second, they illuminate the failures of American
health policy—including a misguided belief in health policy that moral hazard
leads to overutilization. In fact, in many instances, hospital lawsuits implicate
complicated realities of the rules that govern consent.216 Next, they highlight a
glaring inconsistency within health care finance, principally spotlighting a
categorical error between those with publicly financed insurance and those who
have private insurance. And finally, these lawsuits damage patient trust, an
important element to a sustainable health care system.
All four of these impacts demand legal evolution and policy-based
recalibration, and all are examined immediately below.
A. HARM TO PUBLIC HEALTH
When hospitals sue patients, hospitals flip from working to improve patient
health to taking actions that could very well directly harm it. Hospitals seem to
recognize this, characterizing their efforts to sue patients for unpaid balances as
a “last resort.”217 In addition to the impact on physical health, the decision to
seek legal action against patients has drastic psychic effects on the hospitalpatient relationship, transmuting the hospital from a place of refuge committed,
215. See infra Part III.A.
216. See infra Part III.B.
217. See Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6 (“Suing patients or using collection agencies are ‘a last resort,’
[the health system spokesman] added.”); see also Shannon Najmabadi, Some Texas Hospitals Continued to Sue
Patients for Unpaid Medical Bills During the Coronavirus Pandemic, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 27, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/27/texas-coronavirus-hospitals-sue.
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above all, to patient wellbeing, to one which more closely resembles an
adversary in a common business transaction. And the lawsuits impact racial
equity: a recent study demonstrates that these lawsuits can also reflect and
further substantial racial disparities, with Black Americans facing lawsuits at a
higher rate that other racial groups.218
1. Financial Toxicity
Even more direct than positioning oneself as adverse to a patient, lawsuits
can actually worsen patient’s health prospects; bankruptcy, it turns out, is very
bad for one’s health.219 Financial toxicity—a term coined from within the world
of oncology—encourages providers to be cognizant of how the cost of health
care, particularly in the context of the cost of prescription drugs, can
dramatically impact the overall health of the patient being treated.220 In a similar
manner, far too many patients worry that it is the hospital bill—accompanied by
the hospital’s aggressive collections actions—that will actually make them
sick.221 A lawsuit seems to directly conflict with the hospital’s mission; medical
debt—and all of its related impacts—is a steep cost to pay for one’s health.222
2. Impact on Social Determinants of Health
The study of social determinants of health examines societal conditions and
factors that influence one’s health.223 These factors include a broad array of
determinative characteristics, including access to clean air, water, healthy food,
health care, housing, education, transportation, income, immigration status,
employment, medical debt, family deterioration, and exposure to violence.224
218. See Zack Cooper, James Han, and Neale Mahoney, Hospital Lawsuits Over Unpaid Bills Increased by
37 Percent in Wisconsin from 2001 to 2018, 40 HEALTH AFF. 1830, 1832–33 (2021); see also John Tozzi, One
State’s History of Hospital Debt Lawsuits Reveals Racial Gap, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-06/one-state-s-history-of-hospital-debt-lawsuits-revealsracial-gap.
219. See Fenaba R. Addo, Seeking Relief: Bankruptcy and Health Outcomes of Adult Women, 3 SSM
POPULATION HEALTH 326, 328, 331 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5769037 (finding
“bankruptcy was . . . negatively associated with mental health” and “consumer bankruptcy had an independent
and significant negative impact on physical health of older women, lowering the level of self-rated health by a
quarter on average”); see also Susan Gubar, The Financial Toxicity of Illness, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/well/live/the-financial-toxicity-of-illness.html (noting that financial
toxicity is “the acute, sub-chronic and chronic burdens of insured, underinsured and uninsured people impaired
or destroyed by the high costs of care”).
220. See Gubar, supra note 219; see also Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of
Expense into the Standard of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101, 134–35 (2017).
221. See Michelle Singletary, You Get Sick. Then the Hospital Bill Makes You Ill, WASH. POST (Nov. 14,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/14/you-get-sick-then-hospital-bill-makes-you-ill.
222. See Sable-Smith, supra note 140 (“‘It’s absurd that we have to go into debt to be healthy.’”).
223. See Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to Challenging
Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 762, 768 (2020).
224. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 63 (2014);
Matthew B. Lawrence, Against the “Safety Net,” 72 FLA. L. REV. 49, 58 (2020); Alice Setrini, Treating Poverty:
Legal Tools for Health-Harming Needs, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 779 (2020); Kathy L. Cerminara & Barbara A.
Noah, Removing Obstacles to a Peaceful Death, 25 ELDER L.J. 197, 228 (2018).
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Although these factors have been historically treated as ancillary to health care
outcomes, and specifically tangential to the daily work of the hospital, scholars
have recently highlighted their importance in determining one’s health status.225
Patients who are sued by their hospitals are likely to face a number of
stressors that can be expected to negatively impact their health.226 In studies,
debt has been noted to be a particularly prevalent factor that impacts patients and
their health.227 But when hospitals sue patients, other social determinants—like
those patients’ access to secure housing, education, and even personal
relationships—can be put at risk.228 The racial disparities seen in the lawsuits
may further instantiate damaging health inequities based on race.229
3. Deterring Future Care
Beyond the negative impact on one’s health, other downstream
consequences could follow the decision by the hospital to sue. First, and most
simply, seizing an individual’s assets makes that individual less likely to be able
to afford necessary medical care in the future.230 Hospitals have garnished
wages, leaving the patient with meager disposable income, if any.231 When the
individual has no choice but to seek care from the exact same hospital, besides
the shame and embarrassment they feel,232 they could find themselves in a debt
spiral, leading to a medical bankruptcy.233
Aside from leaving patients unable to open their wallets in the future, the
decision to sue can have the mental impact of deterring those patients from
seeking necessary care in the future.234 Follow-up care, pain treatment, and other

225. See Cerminara & Noah, supra note 224, at 227.
226. See Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6 (“Heather Waldron and John Hawley are losing their four-bedroom
house in the hills above Blacksburg, Va. A teenage daughter, one of their five children, sold her clothes for
spending money. They worried about paying the electric bill. Financial disaster, they say, contributed to their
divorce, finalized in April. Their money problems began when the University of Virginia Health System pursued
the couple with a lawsuit and a lien on their home to recoup $164,000 in charges for Waldron’s emergency
surgery in 2017.”).
227. See Frank Griffin, Ashleigh Giovannini, Jay O. Howe, Angie Doss & C. Lowry Barnes, The Law and
Social Determinants of Health: A Clinical Study of Orthopedic Outpatients, 15 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL
L. 145, 149 (2018) (noting that “debt was the most common issue facing the patients in our study”).
228. See Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6.
229. See Cooper et al., supra note 218.
230. See Sable-Smith, supra note 140 (“‘It’s absurd that we have to go into debt to be healthy. And if we
don’t have the money, we can’t go to the doctor.’”).
231. See Simmons-Duffin, supra note 4.
232. See Barbaro supra 190 (noting the patient’s discomfort in seeking care at the same hospital that was
suing her for non-payment following care her daughter sought).
233. See Ungar, supra note 1 (quoting 31-year-old Matthew Fentress of Louisville, Kentucky, who faces a
second potential medical bankruptcy, following a surgical procedure known as an ablation in an effort to correct
a heart arrhythmia).
234. See Kliff, supra note 182 (“‘It makes you think twice about going to the doctor,’ she said. ‘I haven’t
been feeling well for a couple of months, there’s something wrong with my stomach, and everyone is like, “Go
in, go in.” But I just can’t. There will be more doctor bills.’”).
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health-related concerns go untreated due to a fear of expense.235 Patients without
a choice, particularly individuals from rural communities who need to seek care,
may be forced to visit the very hospital for care that is suing them.236
As a result, Americans delay necessary health care due to their inability to
pay for it. A 2018 survey suggested that as many as 30% of Americans or
someone in their household skipped a dental checkup, 26% postponed needed
care, and 21% skipped a recommended medical test or treatment due to the high
cost.237 More than half of Americans surveyed reported delaying treatment, or
settling for a less expensive over-the-counter drug, resulting in 13% reporting
that their medical conditions worsened as a result.238 Made worse by the
coronavirus pandemic, Americans with financial stress are delaying necessary
health care appointments.239
B. HARM TO HEALTH POLICY
From a simple consumerist perspective—the lens that, without radical
reform, continues to be dominant in so many corners of American health care—
patients who end up being sued by hospitals that recently treated them must be
making poor consumer choices. After all, a private market will not naturally
rescue a consumer from their own purchasing mistakes. If an individual buys a
new car but refuses to pay her share of what is owed, she is undoubtedly opening
herself up to suit, or at least some sort of adversarial interaction from the seller
or lender.240 Further, if the buyer finds out later that the service for which she
contracted was unnecessary or becomes undesirable, she still is burdened by the
loss. It is the consumer-based paradigm that leads to this unsurprising result.
Of course, in health care, if the patient does not pay, we know the analogy
cannot be applicable. Indeed, the procedure has already been completed and it
is not possible to repossess the surgery that was performed or the drugs that were
administered. But the same moral judgment seems to persist: why did the
individual seek care if she could not afford it?

235. See Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6 (“UVA, where she got surgery and metal implants, sued her for
$9,505 and rejected her request for financial help. A UVA representative said she could sell some acreage from
her small rural home to pay the bill, she said. She limps and is in pain, but ‘I can’t afford to go back,’ she said.”).
236. See Barbaro, supra note 190.
237. Ashley Kirzinger, Cailey Muñana, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, Data Note: Americans’ Challenges
with Health Care Costs, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 11, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issuebrief/data-note-americans-challenges-health-care-costs.
238. Id.
239. See Abelson, supra note 12 (noting that Americans, after the 2008 recession, “learned to forgo care
rather than incur bills they can’t pay”).
240. See Stefan Lembo Stolba, How Does Repossession Work?, EXPERIAN (Sept. 6, 2020)
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/how-does-repossession-work (“When a vehicle owner is in
default and is non-responsive to the lender’s attempts to remedy the missed payments, the creditor may choose
to repossess the vehicle.”); see also Sebastian Blanco, Auto Repossessions Likely to Rise in 2021 as COVID-19
Pandemic Goes On, CAR AND DRIVER (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a34813379/autorepossessions-predicted-up-2021 (predicting a surge in repossessions in 2021 as a result of the COVID-19 crisis).
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The Consumer Paradigm. Perhaps the consumer-patient fully knew and
appreciated that she would be stuck with a bill but proceeded with consenting to
care anyway. From a patient knowledge or agency perspective, these are the
individuals for which aggressive collection techniques, following a period of
attempts by the hospital to collect, may be the most defensible.241 Of course, if
the individual proceeds with the medically necessary episode of care, but cannot
afford the bill that follows,242 whether or not that individual should be saddled
with the medical bill is still a societal question that should be up for debate.243
Given the fact that other swathes of the population do not experience such cost
exposure suggests that exposing these individuals to substantial cost sharing
seems at least morally dubious.
Emergency Care. The consumer-based analog is completely inapplicable
if the care was emergent; the individual did not have a choice in whether she had
to access care. This is the case for the scenarios in which the emergency room
seeks payment for procedures that were performed out of emergent necessity. In
these cases, the consumer paradigm rings completely hollow because the
consumer has no ex ante agency at all.
Maybe the consumer-patient is directed by her provider to go to the
emergency room during a bout with severe anemia, for example, and simply
does not have a choice.244 Or maybe the situation involves a single mother who
has taken her child to the emergency room with an asthma attack.245 Or, perhaps,
the patient (in this instance, uninsured) needed an emergency appendectomy.246

241. See Anna Werner, Alabama Couple Struggling After Hospital Sues Over Medical Debt: “I Wish You’d
Have Let Me Die,” CBS NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020, 9:53 AM) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/health-care-costsalabama-hospital-sues-patient-to-collect-medical-debt-after-appendectomy (“It is our strong preference to work
directly with patients. Unfortunately, some individuals refuse to engage with us to resolve their balances.
Litigation is always a last resort and is only pursued after we determine the patient has the financial ability to
make some level of payment based on employment status and credit record.”). Id.
242. See Bannow, supra note 179 (noting that “the idea that health systems are suing wealthy people who
aren’t paying for plastic surgery is not true,” and citing a study that found “that the most common employers of
patients having their wages garnished were Walmart, Wells Fargo, Amazon and Lowe’s”).
243. See Public Opinion on Single-Payer, National Health Plans, and Expanding Access to Medicare
Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-singlepayer-national-health-plans-and-expanding-access-to-medicare-coverage (documenting public support of
various universal public health care insurance plans).
244. See Blake Farmer, Nashville Emergency Room Sues 800 Patients over Unpaid Bills, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/tennessee/articles/2019-1222/nashville-emergency-room-sues-700-patients-over-unpaid-bills (“‘He called me back that Halloween day
and said, “I need you to get to the emergency (room), stat, and they’re waiting on you when you get there,”’ she
recalls.”).
245. See Beil, supra note 206 (“Ms. Price let the summons go unanswered, figuring she would settle the
balance—with interest, about $3,600—when she could. A few months later, she opened her paycheck and
discovered the hospital had garnished her wages by $870 a month. Her car was soon repossessed because she
could no longer make the payments. She was on the verge of losing her house, too, when her mortgage company
stepped in to help her save it.”).
246. See Werner, supra note 241 (noting the fact that a hospital sued an uninsured patient for nearly $37,000
following an emergency appendectomy).
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In these cases, the typical consumer paradigm—that the patient is able to
make a balanced decision about whether to seek care, and whether she can afford
it—does not work. In a particularly sad result, patients, without means to pay for
astronomical bills, lament the fact that the hospital that offered care in the first
place saved their life.247 “I wish you’d have let me die,” they say.248
Nonetheless, examples of this categorical type do represent multiple shades
of gray. Some emergent care is truly unconsented to, but there is other necessary
health care that an individual consents to and may feel (or be told) that that care
is necessary. It is hardly the case the individual is making a free choice to consent
to these necessary procedures, and it is hardly the case that these procedures are
elective. Another way to say it is that few come to the hospital for fun.
Incomplete and Incorrect Information. The third category encompasses
cases of incomplete patient information. These are cases where a patient
reasonably, but incorrectly, believes that the care they are receiving from a
hospital is fully covered by their insurance, or at least that their cost exposure is
limited and satisfiable.249
One can easily imagine this scenario: after all, hospital bills are notoriously
byzantine and complex.250 Examples of this category could include the problem
of surprise billing,251 which was finally regulated by Congress in late 2020.252
Even patients suffering health emergencies with the wherewithal to call ahead
to see if their insurance plan covers the type of care they will need have been
unable to avail themselves of complete and clear information and have been
stuck with massive bills.253
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Ungar, supra note 1 (“Financial fears reignited this year when his cardiologist suggested that he
undergo an ablation procedure to restore a normal heart rhythm. He says hospital officials assured him he
wouldn’t be on the hook for more than $7,000, a huge stretch on his $30,000 annual salary.” He then received a
bill for $9,673.71).
250. See David Royse, Confusing Hospital Bills Driving Growth in Bad Debt, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May
13, 2017), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170513/TRANSFORMATION02/170509877/
confusing-hospital-bills-driving-growth-in-bad-debt (“David Silverstein’s frustrations trying to understand the
hospital charges for his daughter’s sports injuries drove him to consider going to court. He had the money to
pay. He simply refused because he couldn’t get a Providence Health & Services hospital in Spokane, Was.,
where his daughter was away at college, to explain the prices in her bills.”).
251. See Karan Chhabra, Kyle H. Sheetz, Ushapoorna Nuliyalu, Mihir S. Dekhne, Andrew M. Ryan & Justin
B. Dimick, Out-of-Network Bills for Privately Insured Patients Undergoing Elective Surgery with In-Network
Primary Surgeons and Facilities, 323 J. AMERICAN MED. ASS’N. 538, 539 (2020); Elena Renken, Study: 1 in 5
Patients Gets a Surprise Medical Bill After Surgery, NPR: SHOTS (Feb. 11, 2020, 2:59 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/02/11/804906330/study-1-in-5-patients-gets-a-surprisemedical-bill-after-surgery (“Tracking data from almost 350,000 patients with a large commercial insurer, the
researchers found that more than 20 percent were hit with an out-of-network charge,” and that the “average bill
was over $2,000 more than what insurance would typically pay”).
252. See Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, supra note 131 (noting the new rules will take place in 2022
and will force health providers and insurers to come up with a fair price to charge).
253. See Lindsey Bomnin & Stephanie Gosk, Surprise Medical Bills Lead to Liens on Homes and Crippling
Debt, NBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/surprise-medicalbills-lead-liens-homes-crippling-debt-n984371 (“She rushed to a nearby hospital, Swedish Medical Center—but
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Worse than incomplete information is incorrect information about
patients’ cost exposure. Stories abound of individuals believing care was
covered by an insurance plan, only to find out that it was not.254 Some patients
allege they were assured by the hospital that certain procedures would be
covered by their insurance, only to be stuck with a huge out-of-pocket
obligation.255
Worse still, some patients have been forced into bankruptcy due to tens of
thousands of dollars in medical bills after their insurance company authorized
the procedure, a practice known as retrospective denial.256 A classic example of
retrospective denial involves a story involving fifty-three-year-old Darla
Markley, who had suffered from transverse myelitis.257 In her case, Markley
agreed to undergo expensive tests at the Mayo Clinic following notice from the
insurer that the testing was preapproved and covered by her plan.258
Following the tests and an additional diagnosis, she was told that the
insurance company “judged that the tests weren’t needed after all and refused to
pay” for the tests that they had previously approved.259 Although the insurance
company denies that they have records that show this sequence of events,
Markley says “she never would have had the tests done if she had known
insurance was not going to pay for them.”260 Other insurance companies, such
as Anthem, have come under scrutiny for their retrospective denial policy,
deployed against patients even following emergency room visits.261
At least for the patients who incur out-of-pocket expenditures as a result of
incomplete or incorrect information, or those who are in such an emergent
condition that their care naturally follows, the current state of affairs—that a
hospital can sue the patient for unpaid medical bills—seems to be a major policy
failure. Similar to those who are misled into consenting to a contract, or even

first called ahead to make sure it took her insurance. When the hospital said yes, Briggs thought that meant she
was covered . . . . But two months after the surgery, she got a whopping bill for $4,727 from the surgeon, Dr.
Emmett McGuire. Like most of the doctors at the hospital, McGuire practiced independently. He did not take
her insurance.”).
254. See Hancock & Lucas, supra note 6 (“When Jesse Lynn, 42, of Orange County, bought short-term
coverage to tide him over between policies, he and his wife, Renee, didn’t realize the plan considered Jesse’s
old back problems a preexisting illness, and therefore would not pay for treatment. After back surgery at
Culpeper Medical Center, a UVA affiliate, he came out with a bill for about $230,000, Renee Lynn said.”).
255. See Ungar, supra note 1.
256. See Lauren Weber, Patients Stuck with Bills After Insurers Don’t Pay as Promised, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Feb. 7, 2020), https://khn.org/news/prior-authorization-revoked-patients-stuck-with-bills-after-insurersdont-pay-as-promised (“The more than $34,000 in medical bills that contributed to Darla and Andy Markley’s
bankruptcy and loss of their home in Beloit, Wisconsin, grew out of what felt like a broken promise.”).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Richman, supra note 138 (“Anthem has justified its policy as a way to reduce unnecessary ER
visits. By targeting diagnosis codes it determined to be nonemergent, the insurer hoped to divert those ER visits
to less-expensive forms of healthcare such as retail clinics.”).
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those who never even consent in the first place, those patients who believe that
their health insurance covers the care to which they consent, and whose coverage
determination is vital to their decision that ultimately results in their giving that
consent—should have some defense to hospitals’ lawsuits seeking
compensation from their own pockets.
In this way, it appears that some of these agreements resemble a type of
conditional agreement. As such, patients could argue that their consent to the
proposed procedure is conditioned on, or depends upon, their insurance plans’
coverage. This argument would protect patients who consent to a procedure
under the misguided understanding that their insurance plan will pay for the care
that is delivered.
At the very least, there appears to be a strong argument that the necessary
meeting of the minds cannot occur where one party is under a radical
misimpression about a material element of the proposed contract. Further,
Professor Epstein has persuasively argued for a contract law remedy based on
the fact that treatment agreements without prices are incomplete contracts.262
C. HARM TO HEALTH FINANCE
When hospitals sue patients, they expose inequities and inconsistencies
within the health care finance superstructure. In addition to raising serious
questions about sacredly-held beliefs and interventions within health care
economics, hospital lawsuits demonstrate the lack of protections for insured
patients who face high out-of-pocket expenditures. For these individuals, a
slightly lower income (Medicaid) or a few more years of age (Medicare) would
qualify them for publicly run insurance and financing programs, sheltering them
from some of the hospitals’ most aggressive collections practices. Indeed, for
those lacking in health insurance, hospital charity care is typically targeted and
available, perhaps to the detriment of the hospital’s bottom line.263 But for those
who enjoy employment-based insurance, too many face hospital collections
efforts. It is here where the law has intervened in the past to protect American
patients whose experience with the American health care system is negatively
impacted by cost, and whose access to care is threatened by it.264
1. The Death of Moral Hazard
High-deductible insurance plans that a growing number of Americans
depend upon rely on policy tools that discourage overconsumption of health care

262. See Wendy Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete Contracts in Health Care, 67 EMORY L.J. 1,
37–38 (2017).
263. See Lisa Rapaport, Nonprofit Hospitals with Healthiest Finances Offer Little Charity Care, REUTERS
(Feb. 17, 2020, 12:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-hospitals-charity/nonprofit-hospitalswith-healthiest-finances-offer-little-charity-care-idUSKBN20B1WS.
264. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (requiring the
administration of emergency care by the hospital regardless of ability to pay).
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services.265 This is a relatively easy policy goal to grasp: if the health insurance
plans force patients to “put skin in the game,” or to experience some financial
pain for their utilization of health care services, then they will be more aware of
the cost of the health care that they incur, and will be willing to consent to such
procedures only when absolutely necessary.266 This policy solution is based on
one of the central beliefs that health care costs are driven by overutilization, and
that overutilization is being driven by what is known as moral hazard.267 Thus,
the thinking goes, insurance that requires more out-of-pocket expenditure by the
patient will pressure the patient into consuming less, pushing down the overall
health care budget.268
But in the cases where hospitals sue their patients, this belief is cast in
serious doubt. First, if moral hazard truly were a driver of excess hospital costs,
and if the system were calibrated to appropriately prevent those unnecessary
expenditures, then few patients would ever be sued. Instead, in those contexts,
the concerns raised by moral hazard have limited purchase. As a result, these
medical decisions cannot be characterized as typical consumer transactions and
cannot be treated similarly.
Second, and relatedly, the formula—intended to dissuade patients from
seeking care that they do not really need—should not apply when the care that
is sought seems to be necessary. This problem has been raised before in
criticizing the proliferation of high-deductible insurance plans.269 When the
system requires substantial levels of cost exposure for patients following
necessary treatment, it begins to look like a rougher financing strategy—that the
hospital is just going to expect a certain (higher) percentage from its patients to
discharge their bills. If the care truly is necessary, then increased cost sharing
seems self-destructive. It also gives hospitals the opening to sue those patients
to make sure they contribute to their health care expenditures, signaling a
financing system—one that should spread risk and loss fairly and adequately—
that has seemingly gone completely off the rails.

265. See Emily Gersema, High Deductible Health Plans Raise Risk of Financial Ruin for Vulnerable
Americans, Study Finds, USC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://news.usc.edu/140182/high-deductible-health-plansraise-risk-of-financial-ruin-for-vulnerable-americans-study-finds (“Advocates of the plans say high deductibles
give consumers more skin in the game to become judicious price shoppers for health care services and stash
money in their health savings accounts (HAS) for basic care and emergencies.”).
266. Id.
267. See Peter Molk, The Ownership of Health Insurers, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 873, 885 (2016) (“In health
insurance, moral hazard is the phenomenon where individuals consume more medical services when they are
insured than when they are uninsured, because insurance reduces the policyholder’s marginal cost of consuming
healthcare.”).
268. Id. (“Insurers combat moral hazard through various cost-sharing arrangements that force policyholders
to internalize some of their costs of medical care.”).
269. See Darla Mercado, High-Deductible Insurance Deters Doctor Visits, CNBC (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:06
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/07/high-deductible-insurance-deters-doctor-visits.html (“Across the
board, workers who enrolled in the high-deductible plan saw the doctor less. This was a problem especially for
lower-income employees.”); see also ROBERTSON, supra note 111.
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2. The Medical Necessity Quirk
The inequities and inconsistencies in the financing system are brought into
stark relief when one watches a lawsuit between a hospital and its former patient
unfold. It is made even more noteworthy when one recognizes how many other
patients—with different types of health insurance—are shielded from similar
financial liability related to their care. This is particularly jarring when one
examines the difference between a Medicare beneficiary and a privately insured
beneficiary on this score.
One can observe the policy-based disparities that exist between a Medicare
beneficiary and an individual who gets health insurance through their
employment. As has been the case over the course of Medicare policy
determinations known as national coverage determinations (NCDs),270 imagine
that a Medicare beneficiary is administered a procedure by a provider that is
ultimately deemed to be lacking in medical necessity. If the provider should bill
for that procedure—the procedure that lacks medical necessity, according to
Medicare—then Medicare does not have to pay for that service.271
What’s more, Medicare could even allege that the administration of that
care that is lacking in medical necessity is fraudulent.272 After all, the provider
is filing a claim for reimbursement with the federal government to pay for a
procedure that lacks medical necessity. Medical necessity-based fraud is
actionable.273
And the federal government, with strong tools like the civil federal False
Claims Act (FCA),274 can allege that a claim submitted to Medicare for
reimbursement for care that lacks medical necessity is a false claim. A fraud
investigation could follow.275 In short, hospitals who face this potential sharp
270. See Medicare Coverage Determination Process, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationProcess (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (“National coverage
determinations (NCDs) are made through an evidence-based process, with opportunities for public
participation.”).
271. Although this sketch could also happen within the Medicaid program, it is more common, and has
drawn more attention, within the Medicare program. This could be because of the disparity in reimbursement
rates between the programs, among other factors.
272. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: PREVENT, DETECT,
REPORT 5, 7 (2021), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
MLNProducts/Downloads/Fraud-Abuse-MLN4649244.pdf.
273. See, e.g., Isaac D. Buck, Overtreatment and Informed Consent: A Fraud-Based Solution to Unwanted
and Unnecessary Care, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 948–50 (2016) (identifying fraud based on medical necessity
as a discrete type of actionable cases); see also Winter v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108,
1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We therefore hold that a false certification of medical necessity can give rise to FCA
liability. We also hold that a false certification of medical necessity can be material because medical necessity
is a statutory prerequisite to Medicare reimbursement.”); Isaac D. Buck, A Farewell to Falsity: Shifting
Standards in Medicare Fraud Enforcement, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4 (2018).
274. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
275. See Harris Meyer, Can a Doctor’s Medical Necessity Decision Be a False Claim?, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Feb. 16, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190216/NEWS/
190219948/can-a-doctor-s-medical-necessity-decision-be-a-false-claim (noting the intricacies of medical
necessity-based fraud investigations and cases).
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edge of liability are incentivized to be mindful of their doctors’ determinations
of medical necessity.
It is a different world when the patient is not a Medicare beneficiary, but
instead, has private insurance. Indeed, in the cases mentioned supra,276 the end
point of the scenario is completely different. Here, where patients consent to a
procedure thinking that the procedure is both medically necessary and covered
by their private employer-based insurance, a subsequent determination by the
insurance company—which concludes that the care administered by the hospital
is not medically necessary after all277— a scenario results where the patient is
on the hook for the bill. As a result, where the hospital is determined to collect
the portion of the bill that is not covered by the patient’s health insurance, the
patient—who may be unable to pay for that difference—is eventually the target
of the hospital’s litigation strategy. This path eventually leads to the courthouse.
A few observations are important. In the first example, where the patient is
a Medicare beneficiary, administering medically unnecessary care to that patient
may subject that hospital to a fraud action. Requiring the Medicare beneficiary,
in that instance, to pay the cost of the care provided—and to be prepared to be
sued for a failure to cover the cost—seems patently absurd.
The specific difference between the Medicare patient and the private payer
patient highlighted throughout demonstrates the decision by policymakers and
the American public that health care provided to Medicare beneficiaries is a
public good. Public financing attaches to the Medicare beneficiary, as does
robust fraud and abuse enforcement. For the Medicare beneficiary, health care
access and delivery are protected, imagining adverse litigation is ludicrous, and,
although beneficiaries are often responsible for about 20% in co-insurance for
Part B,278 where the Medicare reimbursement does not cover the full cost of the
care (according to the hospital), the hospital covers the difference.
Alternatively, for those with private-paying insurance, those who cannot
afford to pay a high deductible and who are sued as a result, are not patients who
are part of the public financing system’s protective umbrella. The private nature
of the paradigm is so strong that it does not protect patients who are sued by the
hospital that once administered care to them. This even holds for patients who
are completely unable to afford the hospital bills they receive, and for patients
whose insurance plans initially presumably approved the care at issue.
As this disparate treatment starkly indicates, the policy boundary between
these patients is not tied to financial need, but rather, insurance type. A Medicare
patient who cannot afford the full price of their health care bill is protected, and
a patient with private insurance is sued. These types of distinctions are common

276. See notes and discussion, supra notes 133–38.
277. Id.
278. See Medicare Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/medicare-costs-at-a-glance (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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throughout the American health care enterprise, to be sure. Unsurprisingly, these
craggy cliffs of policy-based line drawing can breed resentment between
different groups.279
D. HARM TO PATIENT TRUST
Finally, these lawsuits have the tendency to damage and destroy patient
trust.280 Trust is the foundation of the patient-physician relationship.281 Without
it, patients do not seek care when in need, and do not take physicians’ advice
when they should.282
In addition to exacting devastating consequences on public health writ
large, hospital lawsuits seem to vitiate something sacrosanct, and something
deeply personal, in the health care system between individual patients and their
providers.283 As such, it seems likely that hospital lawsuits will exacerbate a
trend of declining trust between Americans and their health care system.284
Indeed, a recent Gallup poll reflected the number of Americans who have
“confidence in the medical system” dropping from 80% in 1975 to just 38% in
2019.285
Health care affordability is a contributor to the decline in trust,286 and
confusing medical advice during a catastrophic pandemic surely has not
helped.287 Unexpected and unaffordable bills are particularly destructive to

279. See Abby Goodnough, As Some Got Free Health Care, Gwen Got Squeezed: An Obamacare Dilemma,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/health/obamacare-premiums-medicaid.html.
280. See FARAH HASHIM, FRANK MIGLIARESE, JR., SARAH BLAKEMORE, SEAN NEIFERT, INDRANI DAS,
MORISSA SCHOCHET, KATY TALENTO, CYNTHIA C. SWARTZEL, ALLYSON KESLAR, MARTY MAKARY, JONATHAN
TEINOR & CHRISTI WALSH, ERODING THE PUBLIC TRUST: A REPORT OF TEXAS HOSPITALS
SUING PATIENTS 6 (2020), https://a2e0dcdc-3168-4345-9e39-788b0a5bb779.filesusr.com/ugd/29ca8c_
095296028da54e778dbfb34987c3cc9c.pdf.
281. See Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 487–89 (2002).
282. See Maria Castellucci, Hospitals, Physicians Try to Rebuild Trust with Patients, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (June 22, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/safety-quality/hospitalsphysicians-try-rebuild-trust-patients (noting “the strong body of evidence that shows mistrust leads to patient
dissatisfaction and lower compliance with recommended treatment”).
283. See, e.g., Martin Makary, Hospitals Go from Serving to Suing the Poor: An Industry’s Fall from Grace,
MEDPAGE TODAY (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/healthpolicy/
82040?xid=nl_mpt_blog2019-09-09&eun=g1354342d0r&utm_term=NL_Gen_Int_Its_Academic_Active
(“Money games and deceptive practices are eroding the public trust in the medical profession.”).
284. See Castellucci, supra note 282 (“The abundance of online health information, pressure on clinicians
to shorten office visits, the rise in out-of-pocket healthcare costs and more awareness about surprise medical
bills and physician conflicts of interest are among the likely contributors to the downward trend.”).
285. Richard J. Baron, Building Trust Can Improve American Healthcare, 7 AMER. J. ACCOUNTABLE
CARE 24, 24 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.ajmc.com/view/building-trust-can-improve-american-healthcare
(also noting that “data from the General Social Survey show that confidence in the people running medical
institutions has also steadily dropped, from 61% in 1974 to just 37% in 2018”).
286. See Reshma Gupta, Leah Binder & Christopher Moriates, Rebuilding Trust and Relationships in
Medical Centers: A Focus on Health Care Affordability, 324 JAMA 2361 (2020) (“One key contributor to this
erosion in trust is likely related to health care affordability.”).
287. See Sachin H. Jain, Catherine Lucey & Francis J. Crosson, The Enduring Importance of Trust in the
Leadership of Health Care Organizations, 324 JAMA 2363 (2020) (“Although the health care industry once
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patient trust.288 This problem has been compounded by the fact that, historically,
hospitals and physicians have not been well-equipped to discuss costs, even
though “for patients, affordability is critical to their personal decision-making
and cannot be separated from clinical issues, such as when considering to pay
the mortgage and grocery bill alongside needing a prescription or procedure.”289
Recent medical scholarship has focused on the goal of rebuilding patient
trust.290 Some authors have specifically targeted high-deductible health plans
(HDHPs) and cost-sharing in an effort to build a “higher-trust health system.”291
This work maligns the “disconnect between a transparent and trustworthy
system that treats patients as humans in need of care and what many perceive as
an increasingly consolidated, profit-driven system that treats patients as
consumers buying goods and services.”292 Indeed, it is not difficult to
understand how hospital lawsuits expose the dark underbelly of American health
care’s unsightly revenue-driven machinery, and damage the ultimate goal of the
entire enterprise—patient care.
IV. BANNING HOSPITAL LAWSUITS
For better or worse, the American hospital is the center of the American
health care delivery system. Now more of the country’s physicians are
employees than owners.293 As physicians are less and less their own bosses, their
decisional primacy may fade or become burdened in different ways.
Particularly noteworthy has been the increase in hospital-employed
physicians.294 The change has been rapid. About 25% of physicians were
employed by hospitals in 2012, but 42% worked for hospitals by 2016.295 By
enjoyed a high level of public trust, conflicting messages about the COVID-19 pandemic, ever-rising health care
costs, news reports of greed, and other factors have conspired to erode that trust.”).
288. See Gupta et al., supra note 286.
289. Id.
290. See id. (“Medical center leadership must acknowledge the foundational relationship between patient
affordability and creating trusting, clinically effective relationships with patients.”).
291. See Dhruv Khullar, Gwen Darien & Debra L. Ness, Patient Consumerism, Healing Relationships, and
Rebuilding Trust in Health Care, 324 JAMA 2359 (2020) (“While consumerism was originally advanced as a
means to empower patients by giving them choice and agency, it has more recently been used to simply shift
costs from employers and insurers to patients . . . . This phenomenon is typified by marked growth in highdeductible health plans (HDHPs) . . . . While patients deserve transparency around price and quality, a growing
emphasis on consumer shopping and cost-sharing is unlikely to be productive.”).
292. Id.
293. See CAROL K. KANE, AMA POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES, UPDATED DATA ON PHYSICIAN
PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS: FOR THE FIRST TIME, FEWER PHYSICIANS ARE OWNERS THAN EMPLOYEES (2019),
https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-07/prp-fewer-owners-benchmark-survey-2018.pdf.
294. Id. (“In addition to changes in practice size, practice ownership is shifting away from physician-owned
practice (‘private practice’) and toward working directly for a hospital or for a hospital-owned practice.”); see
also Alex Kacik, Rapid Rise in Hospital-Employed Physicians Increases Costs, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar.
16, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180316/TRANSFORMATION02/
180319913/rapid-rise-in-hospital-employed-physicians-increases-costs (“From mid-2012 to mid-2016, the
number of hospital-employed physicians hit about 155,000 in 2016, up 63% from 95,000 in 2012 . . . .”).
295. See Kacik, supra note 294.
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January of 2018, that number had risen to 44%.296 While some providers are
happy to join hospitals as employees for stability and predictability, managerial
support, and less legal exposure,297 with hospital employment may come a
reduction in professional autonomy.298 This may lead to a feeling that they are
“losing control of their profession” in working for a business-driven boss, as
“physicians find themselves working for non-physicians, individuals who never
trained in the health professions or cared for the sick.”299 As a result, patient
relationships “are now increasingly embedded in larger organizational contexts
within medical centers.”300 Patients are less likely to only interact with their
provider, and instead, interact with the entire health care organization upon
seeking care.
As the public becomes increasingly aware of hospital lawsuits, there may
be an appetite for legislatures to act.301 Indeed, the bright spotlight of public
attention has had an impact,302 sometimes just hours after reporting has focused
national attention on hospitals’ litigation policies.303 Recently, reflecting public
pressure, hospital systems have “adjust[ed] . . . financial aid guidelines,” calling
its policies “too aggressive.”304 Further, other states have established voluntary
guidelines that “preclude hospitals from seeking to garnish patients’ wages, file

296. Les Masterson, Hospitals Now Employ More than 40% of Physicians, Analysis Finds,
HEALTHCAREDIVE (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/hospitals-now-employ-more-than40-of-physicians-analysis-finds/548871.
297. See Physicians Employed by Hospitals, MEDSCAPE, https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/
891120 (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
298. Richard Gunderman, Should Doctors Work for Hospitals?, THE ATLANTIC (May 27, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/05/should-doctors-work-for-hospitals/371638.
299. Id.
300. Gupta et al., supra note 286.
301. See, e.g., Carol A. Clark, Senate Bill 71 to Protect New Mexicans from Medical Debt Passes First
Committee Following Powerful Testimony, LOS ALAMOS DAILY POST (Feb. 6, 2021, 9:56 AM),
https://ladailypost.com/senate-bill-71-to-protect-new-mexicans-from-medical-debt-passes-first-committeefollowing-powerful-testimony (“SB 71, sponsored by Sen. Katy Duhigg, prevents hospitals—and third-party
medical providers who bill separately—from sending to collections or filing medical debt lawsuits against people
at or below 200 percent of poverty”).
302. See Alia Paavola, Northwell’s 2,500 Lawsuits Against Patients Made Headlines; Hours Later, They
Were Rescinded, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REV. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/
northwell-rescinds-2-500-suits-filed-against-patients-to-collect-unpaid-debt.html (“New Hyde Park, N.Y.based Northwell Health will rescind thousands of lawsuits filed against patients for unpaid medical bills amid
the pandemic.” It also has “decided to extend the pause on legal filings”); see also Joseph Guiseppe R. Paturzo,
Farah Hashim, Chen Dun, Michael J. Boctor, William E. Bruhn, Christi Walsh, Ge Bai, and Martin A. Makary,
Trends in Hospital Lawsuits Filed Against Patients for Unpaid Bills Following Published Research About This
Activity, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Aug. 23, 2021, at 4.
303. See Simmons-Duffin, supra note 4 (“The day after this story published, Mary Washington Healthcare
announced it will suspend its practice of suing patients for unpaid bills . . . .”).
304. Ruth Serven Smith, UVa Announces Plans to Forgive More Medical Debt, Adjust Collection
Guidelines, DAILY PROGRESS (Sept. 13, 2019), https://dailyprogress.com/news/local/uva-announces-plans-toforgive-more-medical-debt-adjust-collection/article_3f6414a5-295e-5f3f-b83c-e5521bd8541a.html; see also
Gupta et al., supra note 286 (noting how Ballad changed its fee structure and “increased its threshold for patients
who were eligible for charity care from 200% to 225% of the federal poverty level”).
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liens on their property or sell debt to a third-party entity without specific
approval from the hospital’s board of directors.”305
These are positive steps, considering how insidious hospital lawsuits are to
patients and the health care system. Nonetheless, these steps may highlight the
need for a standardized solution to the problem of hospital lawsuits. Going
forward, both law and ethics need to be recalibrated to address the problems that
arise when hospitals sue patients.
The hospital lawsuit trend highlights the ineffectiveness of private
insurance in shielding its beneficiaries from the cost of their health care. The
population of patients that hospitals could typically assume would be able to
satisfy their portion of their hospital bills, patients with private plans now need
additional protection. Put simply, hospitals should be prevented from suing their
patients who cannot afford to pay. This legal solution could be an outright
federal ban that prevents any lawsuits against patients of a certain
socioeconomic status.306
It is not controversial for physicians to say that “there is a moral obligation
to care for patients regardless of their ability to pay,”307 but the corollary moral
imperative is to ensure that medically necessary care and emergency care do not
result in an unsatisfiable financial obligation for the patients who need that
treatment. Hospitals are no longer refusing to treat patients who cannot pay;
instead, in these cases, they treat the patients, but then expect them to pay for
their care and sue them to ensure that they do. A policy change is needed to bring
hospitals’ actions into congruence with their moral obligation.
Short of a hard law solution, another potential strategy would be to adjust
the reimbursements for the hospitals that sue their patients. A typical tool for
incentivizing certain behaviors and disincentivizing others, the Medicare
program has increasingly used its reimbursement structure to reward highquality care and penalize deficient or wasteful care for both physicians308 and
hospitals309 through an increasing number of modern initiatives.310 Similarly

305.
306.
307.
308.

Bannow, supra note 179.
See Clark, supra note 301.
Khullar, supra note 291.
For physicians, see, for example, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, MIPS SCORING AND PAYMENT
ADJUSTMENTS (2020), https://www.facs.org/Quality-Programs/SSR/mips/scoring (noting that for “2020 MIPS
participants, a maximum of a 9 percent payment adjustment is possible in calendar year 2022”); Quality
Measures: APP Requirements, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/app-qualityrequirements (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (presenting the quality metrics).
309. See Jordan Rau, Look up Your Hospital: Is It Being Penalized by Medicare?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS,
(Oct. 27, 2021), https://khn.org/news/hospital-penalties (noting that, through the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program, “Medicare cuts as much as three percent for each patient”); Jordan Rau, Medicare Fines
Half of Hospitals for Readmitting Too Many Patients, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://khn.org/news/medicare-fines-half-of-hospitals-for-readmitting-too-many-patients (noting that “nearly
half the nation’s hospitals” were subjected to a readmissions penalty under the Medicare readmissions program).
310. See, e.g., Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP), CNTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/
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here, Medicare could reduce reimbursements to the hospitals that pursue
litigation against their patients, effectively neutralizing the incentive to collect
on those bills through penalty. This would be an easier reimbursement-based
regulatory answer that may be simpler to achieve.
CONCLUSION
When hospitals sue former patients, American health care and patient
wellbeing lose. The lawsuits cause harm to the public health and health equity,
to health care policy, and to the organization of health care finance, and they
erode patient trust. Above all, they demonstrate the absence of a moral tether
that guides the work of the hospital and lays bare the failure of the consumerbased paradigm in American health care. In order to bring hospital strategies
into alignment with public interests, protect the health of the public, and realign
policy goals within American medicine, hospital lawsuits must become a relic
of the past.

AcuteInpatientPPS/HAC-Reduction-Program (noting that the program “requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to adjust payments to hospitals that rank in the worst-performing 25 percent of all
subsection (d) hospitals with respect to HAC quality measures”); Jordan Rau, Preeminent Hospitals Penalized
Over Rates of Patients’ Injuries, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://khn.org/news/medicarepunishment-hac-preeminent-hospitals-penalized-for-rates-of-patients-injuries-medicare-hospital-acquiredconditions-reduction-program-aca (noting that there were 786 hospitals in 2020 that were set to have their
reimbursements reduced under the HACRP). As of the beginning of 2020, more than one-third of the nation’s
hospitals have been subjected to a penalty under the program. Id.

